Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents

Mukherjee, Saptarshi; Muto, Nozomu; Ramaekers, Eve

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.014

Cited by 14 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…No veto-power means that if an outcome is at the top of all but one agent's ranking, then it must be selected by the SCR. Similar positive results are uncovered in other environments by Matsushima (2008a, b), Kartik and Tercieux (2012), Kartik et al (2014), Saporiti (2014), Ortner (2015) and Mukherjee et al (2017). Thus, there are far fewer limitations for Nash implementation when there are partially-honest individuals.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 76%

“…Common to the literature of implementation with partially-honest individuals is also the requirement that every member of society has a taste for honesty, as per Matsushima (2008b), Dutta and Sen (2012), Saporiti (2014) and Mukherjee et al (2017). Thus, if we follow these authors and confine our analysis to this case, we have the following characterization theorem as well:…”

Section: Remarkmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization

Lombardi

Yoshihara

2019

Econ Theory

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A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, “Do not lie if you do not have to”, to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of $$ n\ge 3$$ n ≥ 3 individuals, a social choice rule that can be Nash implemented is termed partially-honestly Nash implementable. The paper offers a complete characterization of the (unanimous) social choice rules that are partially-honestly Nash implementable. When all individuals are partially-honest, then any (unanimous) rule is partially-honestly Nash implementable. An account of the welfare implications of partially-honest Nash implementation is provided in a variety of environments.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 76%

Section: Remarkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization

Lombardi

Yoshihara

2019

Econ Theory

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“…Assumption 1 has been extensively used in implementation problems. Examples include Kartik and Tercieux (2012), Korpela (2014), Matsushima (2008), Mukherjee et al (2017), Ortner (2015) and Saporiti (2014). As in the case of the Dutta and Sen (2012) in Nash implementation, our goal is to examine the effect of the presence of partially honest agents on the strong implementation problem.…”

Section: Axiom Of Sufficient Reason (Asrmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strong Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals

Savva

2017

SSRN Journal

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“…Our main result and its first robustness check are in Section 4. Section C of the Appendix 6 An incomplete list of papers in this literature consists of Matsushima (2008a), Matsushima (2008b), Kartik and Tercieux (2012), Kartik, Tercieux, and Holden (2014), Korpela (2014), Saporiti (2014), Ortner (2015), Dogan (2017), Kimya (2017), Lombardi and Yoshihara (2017), Mukherjee, Muto, and Ramaekers (2017), Lombardi and Yoshihara (2018), Savva (2018), and Lombardi and Yoshihara (2019). See also Dutta (2019) for a survey of recent results in this literature.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%