Implementation of a bluetooth attack on controller area network (CAN)

Abstract

<span>In this paper a general overview of the vulnerability of the CAN bus is presented and a practical short-range attack is proposed. There are more and more potential attacks on the CAN bus, which may cause leakage of information and thereby there may be danger for safe driving. The attack combines several techniques, such as how to update a node firmware using a Bluetooth module and inject a priority fake frame, in order to block the legitimate messages. </span>

Implementation of Wireless User Authentication using WLC-Forti Framework

“…Before cloud-based technology developed, the authentication method used the Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service RADIUS method [5] seems to be sufficient to handle this wireless user authentication problem [6]. A Wireless Controller (WLC) [7] can perform authentication by validating user and password on a RADIUS server to grant registered user access to connect to the wireless network after validating the username and password by WLC to the RADIUS server. The user will be given access to the wireless network, get an IP address from the DHCP server [8] and be given internet access by the Firewall [9] according to the policy that applies to that user.…”

Hardware Implementation of an Enhanced Security and Authentication-Related Automotive CAN Bus Prototype

“…The attack only required about 90 seconds of physical access to the car in order to upload a malicious code onto the car CAN bus. While the previous attacks required physical access to the vehicle, there have been other instances reported of entirely remote attacks against vehicles by exploiting vulnerabilities in the CAN bus [7], [8], [9]. In 2010, a group of researchers showed how they Authors are with Faculty of Sciences and Technology (FST), University Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah, Signals Systems and Components Laboratory (LSSC), Fez, Morocco (e-mail: znitiasmae@gmail.com, nabih.elouazzani@usmba.ac.ma).…”