Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005) Through Cooperative Bioengagement

Abstract

Cooperative bioengagement efforts, as practiced by U.S. government-funded entities, such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Cooperative Biological Engagement Program, the State Department’s Biosecurity Engagement Program, and parallel programs in other countries, exist at the nexus between public health and security. These programs have an explicit emphasis on developing projects that address the priorities of the partner country as well as the donor. While the objectives of cooperative bioengagement programs focus on reducing the potential for accidental or intentional misuse and/or release of dangerous biological agents, many partner countries are interested in bioengagement as a means to improve basic public health capacities. This article examines the extent to which cooperative bioengagement projects address public health capacity building under the revised International Health Regulations and alignment with the Global Health Security Agenda action packages.

Lessons learnt from implementation of the International Health Regulations: a systematic review

“…A total of 33 articles from 60 countries reported experience implementing the national legislation, policy and financing core capacity. 27 , 29 – 31 , 34 – 41 , 44 , 47 , 50 – 54 , 56 , 57 , 59 – 61 , 64 , 66 , 68 , 70 – 74 In Cambodia, India and Uganda, the need to develop basic health-system functions (e.g. expanding access to health services that are essential for treating patients and for disease surveillance) had to be balanced against the commitment to meeting IHR (2005) requirements.…”

“…Experience implementing the coordination and communications capacity was reported in 33 articles from 51 countries. 26 – 31 , 33 , 36 , 38 – 43 , 46 – 48 , 50 – 52 , 56 , 57 , 59 , 61 , 63 , 64 , 66 , 68 , 70 , 71 , 73 , 76 , 77 In Cambodia, India and Uganda, failing to coordinate through the national focal point led to duplication of surveillance strengthening efforts. 30 In Papua New Guinea, capacity to govern is variable at the subnational level, and the reach of the national focal point needs to be expanded to local partners beyond the health sector.…”

Earlier detection of public health risks – Health policy lessons for better compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005): Insights from low-, mid- and high-income countries

“…This finding supports previous insights that were voiced by the WHO, advocating the "One Health" approach rather than limited cooperation between the human and animal sectors that may result in a lack of formalized information exchange. [21,22,11] The aim should be to reach beyond interpersonal or ad-hoc basis, and progress to an institutionalized, concurrent sharing of information and data [23]. Interestingly, this workshop acted as a first forum of this type, offering convivial interactions between professionals from disparate fields, sharing information, understanding each other's challenges and realising that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.…”

Achieving Health Security and Threat Reduction through Sharing Sequence Data

“…Some of these engagements started after the dissolution of the Soviet Union with the goal of eliminating their weapons and redirecting their biological warfare programs. The various needs for assessing and securing biological WMD risks, addressing dual-use concerns, and surveilling infectious disease outbreaks are reflected in certain country and regional engagements (e.g., the FSU, Iraq, Africa, and Southeast Asia, respectively) [2,3]. Such engagements often reflect the partner country’s commitment to and interest in implementing objectives for those international nonproliferation instruments and related frameworks.…”