Implementing CRYSTALS-Dilithium Signature Scheme on FPGAs

Ricci, Sara; Malina, Lukáš; Jedlička, Petr; Smékal, David; Hajný, Jan; Cíbik, Peter; Dzurenda, Petr; Dobias, Patrik

doi:10.1145/3465481.3465756

Cited by 36 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…In Table 1 the distribution parameters are presented for all the three security Next, we used the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution to estimate the upper bound for the error probability. Table 1 shows the error calculation for a 23-bit prime (q 23 = 2 23 − 2 13 + 1) and a 24-bit prime (q 24 = 2 24 − 2 14 + 1). We can see that the upper bound is extremely low for both the primes.…”

Section: Prime Selection For Error-free Multiplication In Sabermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There are only a few FPGA-based implementations of Dilithium [12], [13], [14], [15], [16] in the literature. Their area and performance results along with our work are presented in Table 5.…”

Section: Comparisons With Dilithium-only Implementationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Various works exist in the literature ( [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21]) that present optimized implementations of either a PKE/KEM or a signature scheme. While such works show how to implement a given PQC algorithm optimally, they do not take real-world applications (i.e., both PKE/KEM and signature) into consideration.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Unified Cryptoprocessor for Lattice-Based Signature and Key-Exchange

Aikata

Mert

Jacquemin

et al. 2023

IEEE Trans. Comput.

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We propose design methodologies for building a compact, unified and programmable cryptoprocessor architecture that computes post-quantum key agreement and digital signature. Synergies in the two types of cryptographic primitives are used to make the cryptoprocessor compact. As a case study, the cryptoprocessor architecture has been optimized targeting the signature scheme 'CRYSTALS-Dilithium' and the key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) 'Saber', both finalists in the NIST's post-quantum cryptography standardization project. The programmable cryptoprocessor executes key generations, encapsulations, decapsulations, signature generations, and signature verifications for all the security levels of Dilithium and Saber. On a Xilinx Ultrascale+ FPGA, the proposed cryptoprocessor consumes 18,406 LUTs, 9,323 FFs, 4 DSPs, and 24 BRAMs. It achieves 200 MHz clock frequency and finishes CCA-secure key-generation/encapsulation/decapsulation operations for LightSaber in 29.6/40.4/ 58.3µs; for Saber in 54.9/69.7/94.9µs; and for FireSaber in 87.6/108.0/139.4µs, respectively. It finishes key-generation/sign/verify operations for Dilithium-2 in 70.9/151.6/75.2µs; for Dilithium-3 in 114.7/237/127.6µs; and for Dilithium-5 in 194.2/342.1/228.9µs, respectively, for the best-case scenario. On UMC 65nm library for ASIC the latency is improved by a factor of two due to a 2× increase in clock frequency.

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Section: Prime Selection For Error-free Multiplication In Sabermentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Comparisons With Dilithium-only Implementationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Unified Cryptoprocessor for Lattice-Based Signature and Key-Exchange

Aikata

Mert

Jacquemin

et al. 2023

IEEE Trans. Comput.

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“…During the third round of the NIST PQC Standardization Process, more information about the computational efficiency of the finalists became available. Faster, constant-time implementations were provided for many of the algorithms (e.g., [19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26]), as were implementations that focused on limiting memory usage (e.g., [27][28][29][30][31]). More information about many of the alternate candidates became available as well.…”

Section: Cost and Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, whereas key generation and signing with Dilithium may be implemented using less than 9 KiB of RAM [30], FALCON appears to require significantly more RAM [58], which may make FALCON infeasible to implement on constrained devices, such as smart cards [59]. Furthermore, while a few hardware implementations of Dilithium were developed during the third round [22][23][24]57], [22] notes that FALCON lacks any reported hardware implementations, which suggests that FALCON key and signature generation may be relatively difficult to implement in constrained environments.…”

Section: Cost and Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

Status report on the third round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization process

Moody¹

2022

144

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The National Institute of Standards and Technology is in the process of selecting public-key cryptographic algorithms through a public, competition-like process. The new public-key cryptography standards will specify additional digital signature, public-key encryption, and key-establishment algorithms to augment Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), as well as NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, and SP 800-56B Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Using Integer Factorization Cryptography. It is intended that these algorithms will be capable of protecting sensitive information well into the foreseeable future, including after the advent of quantum computers. The first round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process began in December 2017 with 69 candidate algorithms that met both the minimum acceptance criteria and submission requirements. The first round lasted until January 2019, during which candidate algorithms were evaluated based on their security, performance, and other characteristics. NIST selected 26 algorithms to advance to the second round for more analysis. The second round continued until July 2020, after which seven 'finalist' and eight 'alternate' candidate algorithms were selected to move into the third round. This report describes the evaluation and selection process, based on public feedback and internal review, of the third-round candidates. The report summarizes each of the 15 third-round candidate algorithms and identifies those selected for standardization, as well as those that will continue to be evaluated in a fourth round of analysis. The public-key encryption and key-establishment algorithm that will be standardized is CRYSTALS-Kyber. The digital signatures that will be standardized are CRYSTALS-Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+. While there are multiple signature algorithms selected, NIST recommends CRYSTALS-Dilithium as the primary algorithm to be implemented. In addition, four of the alternate key-establishment candidate algorithms will advance to a fourth round of evaluation: BIKE, Classic McEliece, HQC, and SIKE. These candidates are still being considered for future standardization. NIST will also issue a new Call for Proposals for public-key digital signature algorithms to augment and diversify its signature portfolio.

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