2014
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.004
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Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 59 publications
(35 citation statements)
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“…There is also an expanding experimental literature on real-life matching problems. The experimental literature on the school choice problem has received substantial attention: Chen and Sönmez (2006) test the three school choice mechanisms discussed in Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003); Pais and Pintér (2008) and Featherstone and Niederle (2011) examine the effect of different information settings; Calsamiglia et al (2010) study the effects of limiting the number of schools that can be ranked; Klijn et al (2013) analyze the role of the intensity of preferences and risk aversion; Ding and Schotter (2013) test the effects of communication between subjects and Braun et al (2014) study the imposition of quotas in university admissions.…”
Section: Other Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…There is also an expanding experimental literature on real-life matching problems. The experimental literature on the school choice problem has received substantial attention: Chen and Sönmez (2006) test the three school choice mechanisms discussed in Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003); Pais and Pintér (2008) and Featherstone and Niederle (2011) examine the effect of different information settings; Calsamiglia et al (2010) study the effects of limiting the number of schools that can be ranked; Klijn et al (2013) analyze the role of the intensity of preferences and risk aversion; Ding and Schotter (2013) test the effects of communication between subjects and Braun et al (2014) study the imposition of quotas in university admissions.…”
Section: Other Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…: Q P P P P P P , 7 5 1 3 4 6 2 : Q P P P P P P , 8 : Q P P P P P P , oooo  . In order to solve the above two-sided matching problem, the proposed approach is used and the matching process is displayed as follows.…”
Section: Analysis Of the Examplementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The two-sided matching problems exist widely in many fields of real life, such as stable marriage assignment [1][2][3][4], college admission [5][6][7], employee selection [8][9][10], personnel assignment [11][12][13] and trading partner selection [14]. Therefore two-sided matching is a research topic with extensive application backgrounds.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There has been considerable interest in examining experimentally the static properties of assignment mechanisms, especially strategy proofness (see, e.g., Braun, Dwenger, Kübler, & Westkamp, ; Calsamiglia, Haeringer, & Klijn, ; Pais & Pinter, ).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%