1994
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-58618-0_68
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Implementing secure dependencies over a network by designing a distributed security subsystem

Abstract: It was recently argued that the presence of covert channels should no longer be taken for granted in multilevel secure systems. Until today, multilevel security seems to have been an ideal to approach and not a requirement to meet. The question is: is it possible to design a practical multilevel system offering full security? Based on which architecture? The approach described in this paper reflects some results of a research project which suggests some ideas to answer this question. We have chosen the distrib… Show more

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Cited by 11 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…In this work, we restrict the time window to two consecutive actions performed by a single user identified by its session id (see Figure 4). Using the notion of causal dependencies as defined in [13]…”
Section: A Reducing the Set Of Variablesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this work, we restrict the time window to two consecutive actions performed by a single user identified by its session id (see Figure 4). Using the notion of causal dependencies as defined in [13]…”
Section: A Reducing the Set Of Variablesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, it constitutes a subset of the data being influenced by user inputs, which we call tainted data. The notion of influence between two or more data can be formally defined by the notion of causal dependency [8,19,7]. Denoting (o,t) the content of the data object o (a byte or a variable depending on the level of granularity) at time t, we may then denote (o',t') → (o,t), with t ≤ t the causal dependency of (o,t) in relation to (o',t').…”
Section: Intrusion Sensitive Data Setmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To achieve that, we propose to use the concept of causal dependencies [10,19]. In an information flow, a point (o, t) references an object o at the instant time t. The set of points in the information flow is denoted P .…”
Section: Generated Languages' Randomizationmentioning
confidence: 99%