Implementing the Kyoto protocol: why JI and CDM show more promise than international emissions trading

Woerdman, Edwin

doi:10.1016/s0301-4215(99)00094-4

Cited by 62 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…• A study comparing the effectiveness of CDM projects and international emissions trading systems confirmed that CDM will be more effective than international emissions trading in implementing the Kyoto Protocol (Woerdman, 2000).…”

Section: Cdm Contribution To Sustainable Development Environmental Comentioning

confidence: 97%

An Assessment Of Clean Development Mechanism Project Contribution To Sustainable Development In Nigeria

Pillay

2016

IBER

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Section: Cdm Contribution To Sustainable Development Environmental Comentioning

confidence: 97%

An Assessment Of Clean Development Mechanism Project Contribution To Sustainable Development In Nigeria

Pillay

2016

IBER

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“…They pointed out that if the firms behave under a decentralized ways, they can attain a least-cost solution under joint-cost minimization. Woerdman (2000) quoted part of the work of Rubin (1996) and argued that joint implementation and clean development mechanism projects will be more effective, efficient and politically acceptable than an international emissions trading system. He further concluded theoretically that initial distributional allowances and pricing and trading mechanism are decisive factors in the determination of market participation and trading quantities.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Emissions trading system and supporting policies under an emissions reduction framework

2012

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Emission trading system plays an increasingly important vole in reducing the pollution for environment. Through mathematical models, an analysis is made on the emissions trading system under an emission reduction framework. Four conclusions are drawn: (1) The impact by environmental taxes on the existing firm's choices of optimal discharging amounts is uncertain, the existing firm's discharging amounts will decrease with the increased prices of emissions permits, and paid initial emissions allowances will reduce the existing firm's profits; (2) Under an intertemporal trading system, the existing firm's holding permits conforms to the principle of profit maximization; (3) Under the intertemporal trading system, the prices for emissions permits for the entrant firms are always on the rise and so are their access costs into the industries, thus frustrating local governments' efforts in attracting investments; and (4) Emissions reduction policy is a good regulatory measure for promoting local economic welfare and realizing sustainable development. Some suggestions are also given for triggering and activating the emissions trading system and formulating supportive policies, such as local governments are obliged to set prices for initial emissions permits to dampen the purchasing impulse of the existing firm and to avoid a thin market of emissions permits.

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“…NGOs were also formally allied with specific states: several environmental NGOs "helped the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) with policy advice and scientific backup in the climate negotiations" and lawyers from one NGO, FIELD, "frequently obtained accreditation as members of small islands delegations" (Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2004, 60). The pre-2000 pilot phase of the treaty included a provision for the use of third-party auditors, including environmental NGOs, in establishing the base-line emissions upon which signatories' future emissions allowances would be based (Woerdman 2000). As negotiations entered their final phase in the late 1990s, an increasingly contentious issue among states was the stringency of the treaty's emissions targets and the role of NGOs in monitoring compliance with those targets.…”

Section: The Kyoto Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

NGO monitoring and the legitimacy of international cooperation: A strategic analysis

Pallas

Urpelainen

2011

Rev Int Organ

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States often invite NGOs to monitor international cooperation. Under what circumstances are states likely to take this step? We argue that NGO monitoring allows states to provide domestic publics with credible evidence regarding successful cooperation, but that this credibility carries a cost: if states fail to cooperate, a participating NGO will expose this failure and thus delegitimize the cooperation effort. Our formal analysis indicates that states obtain a dual benefit from NGO participation: in addition to enhanced legitimacy, NGO scrutiny helps states credibly commit to high cooperation levels vis-á-vis each other. The increased costs of failure, however, may deter state use of NGO monitoring. Surprisingly, we find that NGO monitoring is the most useful for states when the cooperation cost is relatively low. We explore the empirical relevance of our theoretical argument in NGO monitoring of World Bank development projects and compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. We also explain why NGO monitoring has been disallowed in the Global Environment Facility. Our analysis provides a firm strategic foundation for the idea that NGO participation sometimes confers benefits to states, and our theory has several empirically falsifiable implications.

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Implementing the Kyoto protocol: why JI and CDM show more promise than international emissions trading

Cited by 62 publications

References 10 publications

An Assessment Of Clean Development Mechanism Project Contribution To Sustainable Development In Nigeria

An Assessment Of Clean Development Mechanism Project Contribution To Sustainable Development In Nigeria

Emissions trading system and supporting policies under an emissions reduction framework

NGO monitoring and the legitimacy of international cooperation: A strategic analysis

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