Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience

Bourget, David

doi:10.1007/s10670-017-9963-6

Cited by 10 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 88 publications

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“…More plausibly (in my opinion, at least), we might be able to represent our own conscious states, our selves, or the present time or location with object-involving contents that include these items themselves as components. If so, then these 17 For views of this sort, see Byrne 2001, Pautz 2007, and Bourget 2017a, 2019, forthcoming. This is a view that I reject, however (see Mendelovici 2018a, chapter 9).…”

Section: Attitudesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Baker follows up on this theme in later work on the metaphysics of everyday objects. In her 2006 paper "Everyday Concepts as a Guide to Reality," she identifies a class of everyday objects that are "intention-dependent," dependent on commonsense psychological states.7 Even if we take useful commonsense views as a starting point in inquiry, if the usefulness and causal origins of many commonsense beliefs can be explained without assuming the truth of those beliefs, this debunks our reasons for holding them.8 I present such a self-ascriptivist view of occurrent and standing state contents in more detail inMendelovici 2018a, chapters 7-8, and2019. …”

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confidence: 99%

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Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions

Mendelovici¹

2020

Common Sense Metaphysics

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According to Lynne Rudder Baker's Practical Realism, we know that we have beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes independent of any scientific investigation. Propositional attitudes are an indispensable part of our everyday conception of the world and not in need of scientific validation. This paper asks what is the nature of the attitudes such that we may know them so well from a commonsense perspective. I argue for a self-ascriptivist view, on which we have propositional attitudes in virtue of ascribing them to ourselves. On this view, propositional attitudes are derived representational states, deriving their contents and their attitude types from our self-ascriptions.

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Section: Attitudesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions

Mendelovici¹

2020

Common Sense Metaphysics

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“…For ‘to see’ may be not ambiguous in it if it merely means the same as ‘to have a visual experience’, while ‘it’ also keeps its own meaning throughout (1) . This general nonfactive reading of ‘to see’ is an alternative reading that is mostly appreciated among nonphilosophers (see Bourget, , p. 382). Indeed, we have seen this reading at work in (10) and (11), which respectively report an illusory, hence nonveridical, and a veridical perception.…”

Section: The Failure Of the Replies Against The Linguistic Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

I See Not Only a Madonna, but Also a Hole, in the Picture

Voltolini

2019

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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According to an intuitive claim, in saying that one sees a picture's subject, i.e., what a picture presents, in the picture's vehicle, i.e., the picture's physical basis, by ‘in’ one does not mean the spatial relation of being in, as holding between such items in the real space. For the picture's subject is knowingly not in the real space where one veridically sees the picture's vehicle. Some theories of pictorial experience have actually agreed with this intuition by claiming that the picture's subject lies in a pictorial space of its own, disconnected from the real space that includes the picture's vehicle. Yet, not only linguistic evidence suggests that when used as above, ‘in’ means precisely that very relation, but an appropriate theory of pictorial experience can justify the above claim.

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“…On the face of it, whether our perceptual verbs are intensional seems like an empirical question: it is a question concerning the meanings of these verbs in ordinary language. Yet in spite of the problem's empirical character, no systematic empirical 1 Among the defenders of the view that we can perceive things that do not exist, whether by sight or otherwise, are Moore (1905Moore ( , 1952, Ayer (1940Ayer ( , 1956, Smythies (1956), Anscombe (1965), Hintikka (1969), Lewis (1983), Harman (1990), Chomsky (1995), Brogaard (2014Brogaard ( , 2015 and Bourget (2017Bourget ( , 2019. 2 Defenders of this view include Austin (1962), Dretske (1969), Cartwright (1957), Soames (2003), and Jackson (1977).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Empirical Solution to the Puzzle of Macbeth’s Dagger

D’Ambrosio

2020

Erkenn

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In this paper I present an empirical solution to the puzzle of Macbeth's dagger. The puzzle of Macbeth's dagger is the question of whether, in having his fatal vision of a dagger, Macbeth sees a dagger. I answer this question by addressing a more general one: the question of whether perceptual verbs are intensional transitive verbs (ITVs). I present seven experiments, each of which tests a collection of perceptual verbs for one of the three features characteristic of ITVs. One of these features is Nonexistence: the failure of sentences involving transitive verbs to entail the existence of their direct objects. The experiments reveal that with respect to all three of these features, "see" behaves much more like a paradigmatically extensional verb than an intensional one. But surprisingly, unlike "see", "perceive" behaves much more like a paradigmatically intensional verb. This shows that the category of perceptual verbs is not uniform with respect to the features of intensionality; while Macbeth does not see a dagger, he may still perceive one.

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Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience

Cited by 10 publications

References 88 publications

Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions

Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions

I See Not Only a Madonna, but Also a Hole, in the Picture

An Empirical Solution to the Puzzle of Macbeth’s Dagger

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