Implications of the cost of public funds in public transit subsidization and regulation

Sun, Yanshuo; Guo, Qianwen; Schonfeld, Paul; Li, Zhongfei

doi:10.1016/j.tra.2016.06.029

Cited by 14 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 20 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…e subsidy is zero and fares are at a higher level for both FF and DBF under the OP models in this numerical study, which means that the subsidy constraint is not binding. For comparison, it must be noted that the problem studied in Sun et al [25] differs from the one presented here. Sun et al [25] reported that the financial constraint is binding at optimality in public transit subsidization, and the operators break even after subsidies.…”

Section: Numerical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 73%

“…For comparison, it must be noted that the problem studied in Sun et al [25] differs from the one presented here. Sun et al [25] reported that the financial constraint is binding at optimality in public transit subsidization, and the operators break even after subsidies. However, the subsidy constraint is not binding at optimality when considering the OP models, i.e., S flat � 0 (or S distance � 0).…”

Section: Numerical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 73%

“…In general, the user surplus is computed as the integral of the fare function (that is, the inverse of the demand function) concerning the total passenger volume. Following Sun et al [25], let B(P) be the inverse demand function of the elastic demand function [28].…”

Section: Solution Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Profit Maximization Model with Fare Structures and Subsidy Constraints for Urban Rail Transit

Wang

Schonfeld

Deng

2021

Journal of Advanced Transportation

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper analyzes government subsidies based on the service design (i.e., headway) and fare structures of an urban rail transit system while considering necessary financial support from the government. To capture the interactions among the operator performance, government subsidies, and passengers in an urban rail transit system, a profit maximization model with nonnegative profit constraint is formulated to determine the optimal fare and headway solutions. Then, the social welfare that results from the operator profit maximization model is analyzed. Finally, a numerical example from Changsha, China, is employed to verify the feasibility of the proposed model. The major results consist of optimized solutions for decision variables, i.e., the fares and train headways, as well as subsidies to the operator. The fare elasticity factor under two fare structures significantly affects fares and demand. As the fare elasticity factor increases, the social welfare gradually decreases and a deficit occurs at low fares and demand, while subsidies rise from 0 to ¥24658.00 and ¥38089.16 under the flat fare and distance-based fare structures.

show abstract

Section: Numerical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 73%

Section: Numerical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 73%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Profit Maximization Model with Fare Structures and Subsidy Constraints for Urban Rail Transit

Wang

Schonfeld

Deng

2021

Journal of Advanced Transportation

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Xu et al [22] has done an empirical research on the interaction between rail transit and commercial property value in Wuhan, and found that the value-added areas are defined within the 400 m radius of road network distance from Metro stations, and the 0-100 m circle increase nearly 16% in value, the outer three circles increase about 8%. Sun et al [23] proposed a social welfare maximization model to identify the relationship between the government and operator in the transit subsidization and regulation problem, it found that the cost of public funds will affect the design of public transit subsidization and regulation policies, and no subsidization for operation costs should be given when the cost of public funds exceeds the critical shadow price of the financial constraint.…”

Section: Reviews Of Related Literaturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Profit Model of Metro Enterprises and Quasi-Market Based Practice of Shenzhen Metro

Zhang

Liao

2018

Urban Rail Transit

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The need to financially support metro enterprises stems from the amplified global enthusiasm for sustainable modes of transport. This paper analyzes the formulation and practice of the profit model based on quasi-marketing initiated within Shenzhen Metro in China. In contrast to previous studies based on a single theory, this paper employs an integrated approach in optimizing gains. Metro enterprises have peculiar attributes such as supply of quasipublic service products, positive externalities, heavy assets, low profit, economy of scale, and economy of scope. Therefore, in order to effectuate sustainable growth, the author has put forward three methods for the profit model based on the quasi-market principle: firstly, generate internal gains of positive externalities through the enterprise's market operation on government-allocated resources; secondly, balance cost and income by modifying the accounting policies on fixed assets depreciation and financing interest; and lastly, maximize economy of scope by enhancing synergy between different business segments and sub-businesses of the same segment in the enterprise.

show abstract

“…Для решения проблемы субсидирования и регулирования работы общественного транспорта учеными из США и Китая Yanshuo Sun, Paul Schonfeld, Hongfei Li [13] определены оптимальные условия для субсидирования с условием поддержания баланса между необходимостью покрытия эксплуатационных расходов предприятий с помощью тарифов и снижением экономической нагрузки на пассажиров.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Profitability of Public Transport

Goryaev¹,

Myachkov²,

Reznikov³

2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Implications of the cost of public funds in public transit subsidization and regulation

Cited by 14 publications

References 20 publications

Profit Maximization Model with Fare Structures and Subsidy Constraints for Urban Rail Transit

Profit Maximization Model with Fare Structures and Subsidy Constraints for Urban Rail Transit

Profit Model of Metro Enterprises and Quasi-Market Based Practice of Shenzhen Metro

Profitability of Public Transport

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About