Implications of vaccine shopping during pandemic

Abstract

Many individuals have strong preferences regarding COVID-19 vaccines and would like to choose the vaccine they get. This practice, known as "vaccine shopping," presents unique challenges to timely vaccine rollout: On the one hand, people may not get vaccinated if they are unable to receive their preferred vaccine, and on the other hand, a policy maker is inclined to distribute vaccines in a brand agnostic fashion to avoid wastage. We study whether a policy maker should allow individuals to choose their vaccine, and the optimal mix of single-and two-dose vaccines to procure. We develop a stylized queueing game-theoretic model that captures the main trade-offs in the interaction between individuals and a policy maker to examine the impact of vaccine choice on the number of vaccinations. Individuals obtain a reward from the vaccine administered at a server and decide whether to get a vaccine based on the wait time, their inclination toward vaccinating, and the level of choice provided. We find that restricting choice results in a greater number of vaccinations when vaccine supply is low by administering doses as and when they become available. Contrary to popular belief that restricting choice wastes fewer vaccines, we find that fewer vaccines are wasted when patients who are moderately hesitant about vaccinating are allowed to choose their vaccine. In this case the possibility of being assigned a nonpreferred vaccine leads patients to forego vaccination, and allowing a choice alleviates this concern. Using a mathematical model for COVID-19 transmission, we find that providing choice results in fewer infections in the United States than limiting choice, and the number of infections is lowest when a lower efficacy, single-dose vaccine forms 5%-8% of the total vaccine dose supply. Our findings provide guidance to policy makers, especially as they plan to vaccinate effectively using a diverse vaccine supply.

Optimal ordering strategy and budget allocation for the Covid-19 vaccination planning

“…To utilize resources efficiently, policymakers may choose not to disclose information about vaccine brands, thereby limiting residents' choices. Nageswaran [12] developed a queueing game model to assess the effectiveness of this measure and analyzed the dynamic equilibrium relationship between individuals and policymakers. The results of the study show that restricting individuals' choices can motivate more people to vaccinate in the case of vaccine shortages.…”