Implicit attitudes and the social capacity for free will

Brandenburg, Daphne

doi:10.1080/09515089.2016.1235263

Cited by 3 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…In this section, I argued that we should think that self-knowledge is important for free action. Importantly, my arguments leave room for social approaches to ameliorating the effects of implicit bias (Brandenburg, 2016;Huebner, 2016). Indeed, it may be the case that when it comes to reducing bias, approaches that prioritize structural and societal changes, both in terms of the information that is circulated and the physical structure of our societies, are best (Huebner, 2016).…”

Section: The Value Of Self-knowledge For Free Actionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…However, while some views of free will require that free actions be those for which an agent is also morally responsible, these questions can be treated separately (Doris, 2015, 11) and I intend to treat them separately here. 2 On the face of it, the observation that there are attitudes that operate below the level of conscious awareness that inform our actions seems to provide strong grounds for thinking that at least some of our actions that are informed by these unreflective attitudes are not free (Brandenburg, 2016). Here I will focus on a specific subclass of these actions that make the problem of implicit bias for free action especially salient: those for which we have reflectively endorsed a reason for action.…”

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The importance of self‐knowledge for free action

Gurrola

2022

European J of Philosophy

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Much has been made about the ways that implicit biases and other apparently unreflective attitudes can affect our actions and judgments in ways that negatively affect our ability to do right. What has been discussed less is that these attitudes negatively affect our freedom. In this paper, I argue that implicit biases pose a problem for free will. My analysis focuses on the compatibilist notion of free will according to which acting freely consists in acting in accordance with our reflectively endorsed beliefs and desires. Though bias presents a problem for free action, I argue that there are steps agents can take to regain their freedom. One such strategy is for agents to cultivate better self-knowledge of the ways that their freedom depends on the relationship between their conscious and unconscious attitudes, and the way these work together to inform action and judgment. This knowledge can act as an important catalyst for agents to seek out and implement short-and long-term strategies for reducing the influence of bias, and I offer four proposals along these lines. The upshot is that though bias is a powerful influence on our actions, we need not resign ourselves to its negative effects for freedom. | MOTIVATING THE PROBLEMPhilosophical work on implicit biases often centers on questions related to the pernicious influences that these biases can have on our moral behavior (Gendler, 2014;Holroyd & Puddifoot, 2021;Kelly & Roedder, 2008;Levy, 2017a). Less has been said about how implicit biases and their unreflective nature may make our actions less

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Section: The Value Of Self-knowledge For Free Actionmentioning

confidence: 97%

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confidence: 99%

The importance of self‐knowledge for free action

Gurrola

2022

European J of Philosophy

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“…1. The phenomenon I call 'implicit bias', following (Mandelbaum 2016;Brownstein and Saul 2016;Holroyd, Scaife, and Stafford 2017;Levy 2017), is also referred to in the literature as 'implicit attitude' (Brandenburg 2016;Buckwalter 2018;Levy 2014Levy , 2015 and 'implicit prejudice' (Baston and Vosgerau 2016;Lai, Hoffman, and Nosek 2013). I take my project to build on this body of literature.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implicit bias: a sin of omission?

Loon

2021

Philosophical Explorations

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It is widely believed that implicit bias is common and that it contributes, in part, to the perpetuation of systemic injustice. Hence, the existence of implicit bias raises the question: can individuals be blameworthy for their implicit bias? Here, I consider what it is about implicit bias that renders agents blameworthy. I defend the claim that, when individuals omit to engage in activities that could prevent the influence of implicit bias on their behavior, they may be blamed for their implicit bias. The plausibility of my proposal depends on whether individuals are able to engage freely in such activities and on whether there exists an obligation not to be biased (broadly put). I will answer positively to the former question and open the way for an answer to the latter, and tougher, question.

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“…The child cannot yet independently recognize how certain considerations have moral relevance in certain types of circumstances and a parent or carer has to help them in making these connections(e.g. Nichols et al 2016). Now, of course, not all forms of social feedback concern the feeling and expression of reproachful attitudes.…”

Section: Attending To Reproachful Engagements With Underdeveloped or Compromised Agentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Average adults can also fall below the threshold responsiveness in a range of certain types of circumstances. There are, for example, a number of arguments in the literature in favour of responsibility-relevant impairments of volitional control over implicit attitudes (Antony 2016;Brandenburg 2016;Huebner 2016;Levy 2016). And people's abilities to recognize moral considerations may also be compromised in certain types of circumstances.…”

Section: Attending To Reproachful Engagements With Underdeveloped or Compromised Agentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inadequate Agency and Appropriate Anger

Brandenburg

2019

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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Communication and cultivation accounts of responsibility (CC accounts) argue that blaming has an important communicative and agency-cultivating function when addressed at someone we consider to be deserving of blame. On these accounts, responsible agents are agents who can understand negative reactive attitudes and are (generally) sensitive to their moral-agency cultivating function. In this paper I examine our reproachful engagements with agents whose moral agency is underdeveloped or compromised. I discuss how these engagements compare to blaming on CC accounts and argue reproachful engagements can have an important communicative and agency-cultivating pointe. I then go on to propose an addition to CCaccounts that explains how underdeveloped and compromised agents can be held responsible. I will show how this addition resolves ambiguities in accounts from McKenna, Vargas and McGeer. I conclude the paper by anticipating an objection CC accounts could raise: that reproach and blame are co-extensive.

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Implicit attitudes and the social capacity for free will

Cited by 3 publications

References 50 publications

The importance of self‐knowledge for free action

The importance of self‐knowledge for free action

Implicit bias: a sin of omission?

Inadequate Agency and Appropriate Anger

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