Implicit bias, ideological bias, and epistemic risks in philosophy

2020

Synthese

Self Cite

It has recently been suggested that politically motivated cognition leads progressive individuals (e.g., liberals) to form beliefs that underestimate real differences between social groups (e.g., in academic performance) and to process information selectively to support these beliefs and an egalitarian outlook. I contend that this tendency, which I shall call 'egalitarian confirmation bias', is often 'Mandevillian' in nature. That is, while it is epistemically problematic in one's own cognition, it often has effects that significantly improve other people's truth tracking, especially that of stigmatized individuals in academia. Due to its Mandevillian character, egalitarian confirmation bias isn't only epistemically but also ethically beneficial, as it helps decrease social injustice. Moreover, since egalitarian confirmation bias has Mandevillian effects especially in academia, and since progressives are particularly likely to display the bias, there is an epistemic reason for maintaining (rather than counteracting) the oftennoted political majority of progressives in academia. That is, while many researchers hold that diversity in academia is epistemically beneficial because it helps reduce bias, I argue that precisely because political diversity would help reduce egalitarian confirmation bias, it would in fact in one important sense be epistemically costly.

Section: Objectionsmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

See 1 more Smart Citation

An argument for egalitarian confirmation bias and against political diversity in academia

2020

Synthese

Self Cite

“…Focusing on task-relevant informational differences, many philosophers of science hold that it is precisely because DD and CD are commonly connected that DD can be epistemically beneficial: via adding cognitive differences to a group, DD can enhance social criticism, help counteract biased belief formation, increase creativity, facilitate a thorough exploration of problem space, and reduce research lacunas (Longino 2002 : 132f; Solomon 2009 ; Fehr 2011 ; Rolin 2017 : 118f; Peters 2019 ). That is, many philosophers take the epistemic gains tied to DD to be mediated by the corresponding CD (Steel et al 2019 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hidden figures: epistemic costs and benefits of detecting (invisible) diversity in science

2021

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

Self Cite

Demographic diversity might often be present in a group without group members noticing it. What are the epistemic effects if they do? Several philosophers and social scientists have recently argued that when individuals detect demographic diversity in their group, this can result in epistemic benefits even if that diversity doesn’t involve cognitive differences. Here I critically discuss research advocating this proposal, introduce a distinction between two types of detection of demographic diversity, and apply this distinction to the theorizing on diversity in science. Focusing on ‘invisible’ diversity (i.e., differences in, e.g., LGBTQ+, religious, or political orientation), I argue that in one common kind of group in science, if group members have full insight into their group’s diversity, this is likely to create epistemic costs. These costs can be avoided and epistemic benefits gained if group members only partly detect their group’s diversity. There is thus an epistemic reason for context-dependent limitations on scientists’ insight into the diversity of their group.

“…In recent years, confirmation bias (or 'myside bias'), 1 that is, people's tendency to search for information that supports their beliefs and ignore or distort data contradicting them (Nickerson 1998;Myers and DeWall 2015: 357), has frequently been discussed in the media, the sciences, and philosophy. The bias has, for example, been mentioned in debates on the spread of "fake news" (Stibel 2018), on the "replication crisis" in the sciences (Ball 2017;Lilienfeld 2017), the impact of cognitive diversity in philosophy (Peters 2019a;Peters et al forthcoming;Draper and Nichols 2013;De Cruz and De Smedt 2016), the role of values in inquiry (Steel 2018;Peters 2018), and the evolution of human reasoning (Norman 2016;Mercier and Sperber 2017;Sterelny 2018;Dutilh Novaes 2018).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias?

2020

Erkenn

Self Cite

Confirmation bias is one of the most widely discussed epistemically problematic cognitions, challenging reliable belief formation and the correction of inaccurate views. Given its problematic nature, it remains unclear why the bias evolved and is still with us today. To offer an explanation, several philosophers and scientists have argued that the bias is in fact adaptive. I critically discuss three recent proposals of this kind before developing a novel alternative, what I call the 'reality-matching account'. According to the account, confirmation bias evolved because it helps us influence people and social structures so that they come to match our beliefs about them. This can result in significant developmental and epistemic benefits for us and other people, ensuring that over time we don't become epistemically disconnected from social reality but can navigate it more easily. While that might not be the only evolved function of confirmation bias, it is an important one that has so far been neglected in the theorizing on the bias.