Implicit Preferences Inferred from Choice

Abstract

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“…Whenever the decision 1 Although there is a growing attention in economics to conscious and intuitive or automatic reasoning. See for example Rubinstein (2007) and Rubinstein (2016) for a distinction between conscious and intuitive strategic choices by players of a game or the distinction in Cunningham and de Quidt (2015) between implicit and explicit attitudes.…”