Implicit stereotyping in person judgment.

Abstract

Three experiments demonstrated implicit gender stereotyping. A target's social category determined the use of previously primed stereotyped information, without Ss' awareness of such influence. After unscrambling sentences describing neutral or stereotyped behaviors about dependence or aggression, Ss evaluated a female or male target. Although ratings of female and male targets did not differ after exposure to neutral primes, Ss exposed to dependence primes rated a female target as more dependent than a male target who performed identical behaviors (Experiment 1A). Likewise, Ss rated a male, but not a female, target as more aggressive after exposure to aggression primes compared with neutral primes (Experiment IB). Experiment 2 replicated the implicit stereotyping effect and additionally showed no relationship between explicit memory for primes and judgment of target's dependence.I consider extremely fruitful this idea that social life should be explained, not by the notions of those who participate in it, but by more profound causes which are unperceived by consciousness, and I think also that these causes are to be sought mainly in the manner according to which the associated individuals are grouped.

Role congruity theory of prejudice toward female leaders.

“…Not only is sex the personal characteristic that provides the strongest basis of categorizing people, even when compared with race, age, and occupation (A. P. Fiske, Haslam, & Fiske, 1991;Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glass, 1992;van Knippenberg, van Twuyver, & Pepels, 1994), but also stereotypes about women and men are easily and automatically activated (Banaji & Hardin, 1996;Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993;Blair & Banaji, 1996). In addition, encoding processes advantage information that matches gender-stereotypical expectations (von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1995), and spontaneous tacit inferences fill in unspecified details of male and female social behavior to be consistent with these expectations (Dunning & Sherman, 1997).…”

Evidence for racial prejudice at the implicit level and its relationship with questionnaire measures.

“…To date, most of the work concerned with this distinction has focused on demonstrating that stereotypic knowledge in general, and racial stereotypes in particular, may in fact be activated effortlessly and influence subsequent judgments unbeknownst to the perceiver (Banaji & Greenwald, 1995;Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993;Devine, 1989;Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986;Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; D. T. Gilbert & Hixon, 1991;Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994;Perdue & Gurtman, 1990). Much less work exists that directly assesses the relationship between implicit and explicit measures of stereotyping and prejudice.…”

Trait Inferences as a Function of Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes and Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions

“…The general lesson from research in impression formation is that categorical-based impressions are relatively effortless and occur under conditions of low motivation or ability, and individuation is effortful and occurs under conditions of high motivation or ability (Brewer, 1988;Devine & Monteith;1999;Fazio, 1990;Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999;Fiske & Neuberg, 1990;Kunda & Thagard, 1996; but see Gilbert & Hixon, 1991;Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Hodgson, & Dunn, 1998). Most models of impression formation assume that stereotypes and other group level information are activated from memory on perception of a group member (e.g., Banaji & Hardin, 1996;Banaji, Harden, & Rothman, 1993;Brewer, 1988;Devine, 1989;Fiske et al, 1999). 1 More deliberate and careful processing, on the other hand, can occur as the target's power over the perceiver increases (Fiske et al, 1999), under expectations of future interaction with the target (Johnston, Hewstone, Pendry, & Frankish, 1994), increased accountability for one's judgments (Tetlock, 1992), fear of invalidity (Kruglanski, 1989), and with the presence of unexpected, difficult, or surprising information that begs an explanation (Kintsch, 1988;Kunda, 1990).…”