Impossible meet-in-the-middle fault analysis on the LED lightweight cipher in VANETs

Abstract

With the expansion of wireless technology, vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) are emerging as a promising approach for realizing smart cities and addressing many serious traffic problems, such as road safety, convenience, and efficiency. To avoid any possible rancorous attacks, employing lightweight ciphers is most effective for implementing encryption/decryption, message authentication, and digital signatures for the security of the VANETs. Light encryption device (LED) is a lightweight block cipher with two basic keysize variants: LED-64 and LED-128. Since its inception, many fault analysis techniques have focused on provoking faults in the last four rounds to derive the 64-bit and 128-bit secret keys. It is vital to investigate whether injecting faults into a prior round enables breakage of the LED. This study presents a novel impossible meet-in-the-middle fault analysis on a prior round. A detailed analysis of the expected number of faults is used to uniquely determine the secret key. It is based on the propagation of truncated differentials and is surprisingly reminiscent of the computation of the complexity of a rectangle attack. It shows that the impossible meet-in-the-middle fault analysis could successfully break the LED by fault injections.

An Effective Simulation Analysis of Transient Electromagnetic Multiple Faults

“…Then, WK can be obtained according to the following formula: 16 ). (14) According to the key schedule of Midori, the adversary makes further derivations to obtain K 0 . The equations are shown in Equations (15) to (19).…”

“…Since Boneh et al [9] used fault attacks to break RSA, effective fault analysis methods have become research hotspot. In lightweight block encryption analysis, fault attacks have been extended to impossible differential fault attack (IDFA) [10], impossible differential attack (IDA) [11,12], algebraic fault attack (AFA) [13], impossible meet-in-the-middle attack (IMMA) [14], differential fault attack (DFA) [15] and blind fault attack [16]. These methods mainly analyze the characteristic relationship between the data of the cryptosystem after the injection fault and obtain the secret key by means of solver and mathematical analysis.…”

Correlation power analysis and effective defense approach on light encryption device block cipher

“…This scheme requires 2 16 key searches to correctly guess the secret key. Li et al proposed a novel impossible meet‐in‐the‐middle fault analysis to break the LED. In this attack, the faults can be inserted into the fourth last round of the LED, and subsequently the more rounds are affected.…”

Flexible structures of lightweight block ciphers PRESENT, SIMON and LED

“…The PRESENT block cipher was standardised by ISO/IEC 29192-2 [14] and the SIMON cipher has been standardised by ISO as a part of the radio frequency identification (RFID) air interface standard, International Standard ISO/29167-21 for use by commercial entities. The security and robustness of PRESENT, SIMON, and LED are investigated in [11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18] by testing resistance against different attacks such as linear attack, differential attack, boomerang attack, higher-order differential attack, interpolation attack, impossible differential attack, improved zero-correlation attack, cube tester, square/collision attack, impossible meet-in-the-middle (MITM) fault analysis, algebraic, and rectangle. The slide attack is a block cipher cryptanalysis technique [13] that exploits the degree of selfsimilarity of a permutation.…”