Improved Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks on 7 and 8-Round ARIA-192 and ARIA-256

Akshima,; Chang, Donghoon; Ghosh, Mohona; Goel, Aarushi; Sanadhya, Somitra Kumar

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-26617-6_11

Cited by 8 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Chen and Xu [17] presented biclique attacks on full-round ARIA-256 with about 2 255.2 encryptions. Tang and others [10] employed a meet-in-the-middle attack to break seven rounds of ARIA-192 and eight rounds of ARIA-256, which were improved by Akshima and others [11] and Bai and others [12], respectively. However, the security of ARIA against differential-linear attack is still unclear.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multidimensional Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of ARIA Block Cipher

Yi¹,

Ren²,

Chen³

2017

ETRI J

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ARIA is a 128‐bit block cipher that has been selected as a Korean encryption standard. Similar to AES, it is robust against differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. In this study, we analyze the security of ARIA against differential‐linear cryptanalysis. We present five rounds of differential‐linear distinguishers for ARIA, which can distinguish five rounds of ARIA from random permutations using only 284.8 chosen plaintexts. Moreover, we develop differential‐linear attacks based on six rounds of ARIA‐128 and seven rounds of ARIA‐256. This is the first multidimensional differential‐linear cryptanalysis of ARIA and it has lower data complexity than all previous results. This is a preliminary study and further research may obtain better results in the future.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multidimensional Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of ARIA Block Cipher

Yi¹,

Ren²,

Chen³

2017

ETRI J

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“…In 2015, Akshima et al [19] presented the master key recovery attacks on ARIA for the first time. Through the guess-anddetermine technique, we present an efficient algorithm to recover the master key.…”

Section: The Procedures Of Recovering the Master Key For Aria-192mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Through the guess-anddetermine technique, we present an efficient algorithm to recover the master key. Taking step (1) of the master key recovery algorithm as an example, if we guess 2 128 values of 0 as proposed in [19], the time complexity is equal to 2 128 × (1/7) = 2 125.2 7-round ARIA encryptions. Based on guess-and-determine technique, the time complexity can be reduced to 2 76.5 7-round ARIA encryptions in this paper.…”

Section: The Procedures Of Recovering the Master Key For Aria-192mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(5) For current 0, (1,4,11,14) , guess 0, (5,15) and partially encrypt plaintext pairs in (2) , and then select plaintext pairs whose difference (5,15) satisfies the equation (18 (1,4,5,11,14,15) , guess 0, (7,13) and partially encrypt plaintext pairs in (3) , and then select plaintext pairs whose difference (7,13) satisfies (19). We store 2 +103 × 2 −8 = 2 +95 remaining ( (7,13) , SL 1,(7,13) ) and its SN in table (4) indexed by 0,(7,13) .…”

Section: The Procedures Of 7-round Attack Onmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Then Du and Chen [13] proposed a 7-round impossible differential attack on ARIA-256. Xie and Chen [14] presented a 7-round impossible differential attack on ARIA-192 (however, we find 2 Security and Communication Networks [19] mk: recover the actual master key; -: not given in the related paper.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Multiple Impossible Differentials Cryptanalysis on 7-Round ARIA-192

Jiang

Jin

2018

Security and Communication Networks

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This paper studies the security of 7-round ARIA-192 against multiple impossible differentials cryptanalysis. We propose six special 4-round impossible differentials which have the same input difference and different output difference with the maximum number of nonzero common bytes. Based on these differentials, we construct six attack trails including the maximum number of common subkey bytes. Under such circumstances, we utilize an efficient sieving process to improve the efficiency of eliminating common subkeys; therefore, both data and time complexities are reduced. Furthermore, we also present an efficient algorithm to recover the master key via guess-and-determine technique. Taking advantage of the above advances, we have obtained the best result so far for impossible differential cryptanalysis of ARIA-192, with time, data, and memory complexities being 2 189.8 7-round ARIA encryptions, 2 116.6 chosen plaintexts, and 2 139.3 bytes, respectively.

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Programming the Demirci-Selçuk Meet-in-the-Middle Attack with Constraints

Shi

Sun

Derbez

et al. 2018

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Cryptanalysis with SAT/SMT, MILP and CP has increased in popularity among symmetric-key cryptanalysts and designers due to its high degree of automation. So far, this approach covers differential, linear, impossible differential, zero-correlation, and integral cryptanalysis. However, the Demirci-Selçuk meet-in-the-middle (DS-MITM) attack is one of the most sophisticated techniques that has not been automated with this approach. By an in-depth study of Derbez and Fouque's work on DS-MITM analysis with dedicated search algorithms, we identify the crux of the problem and present a method for automatic DS-MITM attack based on general constraint programming, which allows the cryptanalysts to state the problem at a high level without having to say how it should be solved. Our method is not only able to enumerate distinguishers but can also partly automate the key-recovery process. This approach makes the DS-MITM cryptanalysis more straightforward and easier to follow, since the resolution of the problem is delegated to offthe-shelf constraint solvers and therefore decoupled from its formulation. We apply the method to SKINNY, TWINE, and LBlock, and we get the currently known best DS-MITM attacks on these ciphers. Moreover, to demonstrate the usefulness of our tool for the block cipher designers, we exhaustively evaluate the security of 8! = 40320 versions of LBlock instantiated with different words permutations in the F functions. It turns out that the permutation used in the original LBlock is one of the 64 permutations showing the strongest resistance against the DS-MITM attack. The whole process is accomplished on a PC in less than 2 hours. The same process is applied to TWINE, and similar results are obtained.

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Improved Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks on 7 and 8-Round ARIA-192 and ARIA-256

Cited by 8 publications

References 12 publications

Multidimensional Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of ARIA Block Cipher

Multidimensional Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of ARIA Block Cipher

Multiple Impossible Differentials Cryptanalysis on 7-Round ARIA-192

Programming the Demirci-Selçuk Meet-in-the-Middle Attack with Constraints

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