2012
DOI: 10.1109/mdt.2012.2210183
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Improving IC Security Against Trojan Attacks Through Integration of Security Monitors

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Cited by 50 publications
(19 citation statements)
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“…HTs can be inserted in 978-1-4799-1585-9/13/$31.00 ©20 13 IEEE specification and design phases [1], but it is more common to implant hardware Trojans during fabrication, assembly and packing phases [3]. Layout-level HTs change the width of metal wires, reassign metal layers or alter interconnect length.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…HTs can be inserted in 978-1-4799-1585-9/13/$31.00 ©20 13 IEEE specification and design phases [1], but it is more common to implant hardware Trojans during fabrication, assembly and packing phases [3]. Layout-level HTs change the width of metal wires, reassign metal layers or alter interconnect length.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Run-time approaches. These approaches monitor for unexpected changes in logical and side-channel behavior to detect Trojans, but do so after the IC has been deployed (e.g., [7], [8], [10], [18]). Resource overheads have been the main disadvantage of run-time monitoring [2].…”
Section: A Hardware Trojans and Countermeasuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Run-time approaches on the other hand can be utilized for the entire lifetime of the IC. Hence, any Trojan missed during test-time can be found if the Trojan ever gets activated (e.g., [7], [8]). Second, an IC with an inactive Trojan performs essentially the same functions as a Trojan-free IC.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, a path delay characterization approach was proposed in [7] which, while effective, suffers from considerable area overhead for modern designs with millions of paths [1]. The current sensor approach in [8] should also come with significant area and power overheads. Temperature-based Trojan detection is an unexplored avenue which should have lower overheads compared to previous run-time approaches since many electronic systems are already equipped with thermal sensors for dynamic thermal management (DTM).…”
Section: B Relationship Between Power and Temperaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hence, any Trojan missed during test-time can be found if the Trojan ever gets activated (eg. [7], [8]). Second, an IC with an inactive Trojan performs essentially the same functions as a Trojan-free IC.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%