Improving performance and reducing cost in buyer–supplier relationships: The role of justice in curtailing opportunism

Opportunism, governance structure and relational norms: An interactive perspective

“…Firms may adopt different governance structures that are bureaucratic and/or relational norms based to manage opportunism. Recently, some studies have looked at various factors that interact with governance structures to influence opportunistic behavior, including transaction specific assets & embeddedness (Liu et al, 2014), perceptions of justice (Luo, Liu, Yang, Maksimov, & Hou, 2015), goal congruity, economic factors and unfairness (Kang & Jindal, 2015), and national culture (Handley & Angst, 2015). While these studies allude to firms using plural forms of governance structures, none of them examine the joint effects of bureaucratic and relational governance on opportunism (Kang & Jindal, 2015).…”

“…In sum, when proper governance mechanisms (channel bureaucracy and relational norms) are selected and implemented in a complementary manner, the controls work more effectively to reduce opportunism (Handley & Angst, 2015;Jaworski, 1988). However, if the governance mechanisms are not complementary, but rather substitutive, implementing both mechanisms at the same time may lead to exchange hazards and higher opportunism (Liu et al, 2014;Luo et al, 2015). Sometimes, when bureaucratic and relational governance structures are combined, they may fail to impede opportunistic behavior if they do not complement one another.…”

Betrayal in buyer–seller relationships: Exploring its causes, symptoms, forms, effects, and therapies

“…In fact, a constant flow of reliable and timely information acts as "glue" to hold members of the relationship together, because it boosts confidence about the value of the relationship, enhances the belief that there is honesty in transactions, and prevents any negative intentions (Mohr & Nevin, 1990;Nes, Solberg, & Silkoset, 2007). However, if there is an interruption in the flow of critical and valuable information, this will lead to a feeling that interests are jeopardized, expectations are violated, and norms are challenged (Luo, Liu, Yang, Maksimov, & Hou, 2015). All these are good reasons for betrayal.…”

Effects of external uncertainties and power on opportunism in supply chains: evidence from China

“…The widely used control mechanisms are power (Caniëls and Gelderman 2010;Handley and Benton 2012;Hernández-Espallardo and Arcas-Lario 2003), contract (Brown, Cobb, and Lusch 2006;Cavusgil, Deligonul, and Zhang 2004;Liu, Luo, and Liu 2009), relational norms (Brown, Cobb, and Lusch 2006;Cavusgil, Deligonul, and Zhang 2004;Liu, Luo, and Liu 2009), justice (Luo et al 2015), information sharing (Eckerd and Hill 2012;Wang, Ye, and Tan 2014), specific investment (Handley and Benton 2012;Liu, Liu, and Li 2014;Yu, Liao, and Lin 2006), and other factors (Kang and Jindal 2015). While most studies have focused on the effect of dependence on opportunism, the influence of power on opportunistic behaviour has been investigated less (Hawkins, Knipper, and Strutton 2009).…”