Improving slot allocation at Level 3 airports

Ribeiro, Nuno; Jacquillat, Alexandre; Antunes, António Pais; Odoni, Amedeo R.

doi:10.1016/j.tra.2019.06.014

Cited by 10 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…These multi-objective (potentially conflicting) factors provide additional degrees of freedom for considering public interest aspects related to slot allocation, other than the reservation of certain slots for regional services or services with public service obligations. A comprehensive description of the entire allocation process can be found in Zografos et al (2017) and in Ribeiro et al (2019).…”

Section: The Current Slot Allocation Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Given the complexity of the coordinator's allocation task, some software tools are available but do not provide optimization capabilities (Jorge et al, 2021) while several authors have proposed optimization algorithms and models that differ in the optimization criteria, the priority rules considered, the type of airport capacity constraints addressed, and other aspects of the optimization process design (Zografos et al, 2012;Zografos & Jiang, 2019;Ribeiro et al, 2019;Fairbrother et al, 2020;Jiang & Zografos, 2021;, as described in the recent literature review by Katsigiannis & Zofrafos, 2021.However, even though the implementation of these optimization algorithms might look simple and could contribute to some improvement in the slot allocation process, slot utilization and airport congestion consequences , the optimization of the administrative allocation process does not address the core problem of economic inefficiency.…”

Section: Alternative Approaches For Slot Allocationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Scoring auctions: are they the key to marketbased allocation of airport slots?

Cardadeiro¹,

Gata²

2021

ERBE

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Air transport has increased almost fifteen-fold worldwide in the last half-century and is expected to return to this trend in the next few years, after falling from 4.558 billion passengers in 2019 to 1.809 billion passengers in 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Airport capacity has not kept pace with such growth and, therefore, more than two hundred major airports worldwide face capacity constraints and are "coordinated". Efficient allocation of scarce airport capacity is critical for air traffic growth, as well as for the overall air transport dynamic efficiency. However, the allocation of airport slots in Europe and elsewhere is still ruled by administrative processes, based on the IATA Worldwide Slot Guidelines, which follow historical precedence (called "Grandfather Rights") and time adjustments of historical slots. Several objections have been raised to the adoption of market mechanisms in slot allocation, as an alternative to administrative processes, and they are still rarely used. Despite often being suggested in the literature, the use of auctions for slot allocation has only been implemented in some local routes in China, and apparently this underemployment of auction mechanisms has been due to the reluctance of coordination authorities to face the risks that have been pointed out regarding airlines' long-term route planning, the usage costs related to excess slots, origin-destination pairing, and competition distortions. However, scoring auctions have never been considered and our research shows that their properties combined with an appropriate auction design could overcome most of those objections and mitigate the associated risks. Furthermore, the current drop in air traffic provides an opportune window for the introduction of auctions as a mechanism for the allocation of airport slots with minimal risks of disruption to airline business models.IN 2019, A "NORMAL YEAR", 1 the aviation industry supported 11.3 million direct aviation jobs and a total of 87.7 million jobs worldwide (the sum of direct aviation jobs, indirect jobs, induced jobs, and tourism catalytic jobs -see next paragraph). It contributed, in a direct way to global GDP by an estimated * The authors are grateful to Lara Gamas for her inspiring work on slot auctions in the context of her MSc degree in Economics. This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

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Section: The Current Slot Allocation Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Alternative Approaches For Slot Allocationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scoring auctions: are they the key to marketbased allocation of airport slots?

Cardadeiro¹,

Gata²

2021

ERBE

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“…There are also studies that consider all of the priority rules in the WSG for slot allocation. [7][8][9] The limitations of a single-airport slot allocation model are obvious. The main drawback is that the model ignores the continuity and consistency of flights in the origin and destination airports.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Slot Allocation in a Multi-airport System under Flying Time Uncertainty

LIU,

LIAO,

HANG

et al. 2024

Trans. Japan Soc. Aero. S Sci.

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Slot allocation in a single airport aims to maximize the utilization of airport-declared capacity under operational and regulation constraints, while that in a multi-airport system (MAS) has to take airspace capacity into account. This is due to the fact that the conflict of using the limited capacity of certain departure/arrival fixes in the terminal airspace could induce unnecessary flight delays. The uncertainty of flying times between the airport and congested fixes makes it even more complicated for slot allocation in a MAS. Traffic flow may exceed capacity when the flying times of flights change. In this paper, the authors propose an uncertainty slot allocation model for a MAS (USAM). The objective of the model is to minimize the total displacement of slot requests in the MAS while considering all of the capacity constraints, as well as the uncertainty of flying time. The constraints of departure/arrival fixes are formulated as chance constraints, and then the Lyapunov theorem is applied for reformulation. The USAM is applied in the MAS of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (GBA). Specifically, the impact of the uncertainty of flying times from five airports to airspace fix YIN is investigated. Results show that the total displacement would increase if the uncertainty of flying time was considered. The optimized schedule using the USAM, however, is more robust and can satisfy capacity constraints under various scenarios.

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