Improvising border security: ‘A situation of security pluralism’ along South Sudan’s borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Abstract

This article compares two cases of securitization along South Sudan's border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. By comparing how a security concern -the presence of the Lord's Resistance Army -was interpreted and responded to, the article shows that border security practices in two borderscapes are improvised, contradictory and contested, and serve to establish authority rather than actually securing the border. This is apparent on three levels: (a) through the multiplicity of security actors vying for authority; (b) in how they interpret security concerns; and (c) in terms of what practice follows. The article argues that by allowing authority at the border to be taken by actors that are not under direct control of the central government, the South Sudanese state is developing as one that controls parts of the country in absentia, either by granting discretionary powers to low-level government authorities at the border or through tactical neglect. Processes of securitization by both state and non-state actors in the borderland are largely disconnected from the South Sudanese central government, which does not claim authority over this border and thus seemingly does not consider the lack of security for its citizens, and the parallel authorities, as a threat to central stability.

‘And Then He Switched off the Phone’: Mobile Phones, Participation and Political Accountability in South Sudan’s Western Equatoria State

“…The question of the positive role of mobile phones in increasing political accountability has to be seen particularly in connection to the former presence of the LRA. One of the local population's grievances against the central government is the lack of protection that government troops provided against the LRA; in fact, government reactions to what was at the time a very real security threat were seen as deliberately subdued (Schomerus and De Vries 2014). Some negative attitudes towards mobile phones that we encountered need to be seen in this context: A few respondents argued that people with bad intentions-i.e.…”

“…Particularly in 2008 and 2009, the LRA also committed violence against civilians in WES, with more sporadic incidents in the following years. A military operation against the LRA involving international troops has maintained a high sense of insecurity and militarization (Gordon et al 2007;Atkinson 2009;Schomerus and Tumutegyereize 2009;Schomerus 2012;Schomerus and De Vries 2014;Rigterink et al 2014). The question of the positive role of mobile phones in increasing political accountability has to be seen particularly in connection to the former presence of the LRA.…”

An assemblage approach to liquid warfare: AFRICOM and the ‘hunt’ for Joseph Kony

“…The last major reported LRA attacks were in retaliation for Operation Lightning Thunder. After 2010, however, and thus prior to the active involvement of AFRICOM, the level of LRA violence and abductions declined dramatically, reaching an all-time low in 2011 and 2012 ( Branch, 2012 ; Forest, 2014 ; Schomerus and Vries, 2014 ; Titeca and Costeur, 2015 ). From then onwards, the LRA counted only an estimated 250 armed fighters, and its trademark attacks became much smaller scale and much less frequent ( Titeca and Costeur, 2015 : 100).…”

Reproducing remoteness? States, internationals and the co-constitution of aid ‘bunkerization’ in the East African periphery

“…This focus on borderlands allows for the incorporation of traditionally 'strong' states such as Ethiopia into the analysis alongside weaker ones such as Sudan and Chad. Moreover, this approach acknowledges the growing ambivalence among Africanist scholars on the degree of choice exercised by African states (including inter alia Uganda, DRC and South Sudan) in projecting strong or weak state presence in parts of their territories (Fisher 2014;Schomerus and de Vries 2014).…”