In defence of explanatory realism

Abstract

Explanatory realism is the view that explanations work by providing information about relations of productive determination such as causation or grounding. The view has gained considerable popularity in the last decades, especially in the context of metaphysical debates about non-causal explanation. What makes the view particularly attractive is that it fits nicely with the idea that not all explanations are causal whilst avoiding an implausible pluralism about explanation. Another attractive feature of the view is that it allows explanation to be a partially epistemic, context-dependent phenomenon. In spite of its attractiveness, explanatory realism has recently been subject to criticism. In particular, Taylor (Philos Stud 175(1):197–219, 2018). has presented four types of explanation that the view allegedly cannot account for. This paper defends explanatory realism against Taylor’s challenges. We will show that Taylor’s counterexamples are either explanations that turn out to provide information about entities standing in productive determination relations or that they are not genuine explanations in the first place.

A conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation

“…Finally, I may be able to rule this case out by arguing that it is a case of denying one of the why-question's presuppositions, which is something distinct from explanation (Roski 2021). The narrowed whyquestion presupposes that Claire's having 2+3 apples and her having 5 apples are distinct facts, and the putative explanation undermines 37 Lange (2016, pp.xviii-xix) mentions identity explanations favorably: "that Samuel Clemens and Mark Twain are identical explains non-causally why they have the same height, weight, and birth dates".…”

“…This seems implausible though. In his (2022) debate with Roski (2021) over "really statistical" explanations, he says that an indication that p is a presupposition of the question "Why is p the case?" is that it is pragmatically infelicitous to say "I do not want to assume that p is the case.…”

Comprometido, Mas Não Casado, Com Solteiros: Explodindo O Critério De Compromisso Ontológico De Quine

“…Another kind of case Roski appeals to is the explanation of the correctness of a decision, for example, when we ask if the decision of sending a player off was correct. Roski admits that in this kind of case "information about causes (...) would be beside the point-the information would not just be conversationally inappropriate but explanatorily irrelevant" (Roski, 2021). Therefore, we have a rule-based explanation that does not appeal to or convey causal information.…”

“…Is that a counterexample to ER? Rosky says no, and his argument is remarkably short: "the fact that is correct that p is plausibly grounded by the fact that certain rules dictate that p" (Roski, 2021).…”