In Defence of Non-Ideal Political Deference

Brinkmann, Matthias

doi:10.1017/epi.2020.26

Cited by 19 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 45 publications

(90 reference statements)

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“…2 Failure to recognize this leads to an insufficient understanding of how that relationship is playing out in our political culture and the potential ways forward available to us. In this regard, the paper aims to contribute to the recent body of literature that has challenged the supposed conflict between group loyalty and truth and explored how identities can be made “safe for democracy” (e.g., Brinkmann 2022; Chambers 2018; Darby and Martinez 2022; Lepoutre 2020). It gives us further reason for thinking that pitting loyalty against truthfulness at some very general or conceptual level is deeply misguided, though it does so on the quite different grounds that both speak to genuine human needs or dimensions of the human condition.…”

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Truth and Loyalty

Sleat

2023

Political Theory

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This paper explores the relationship between truth and loyalty as it pertains to epistemic issues within contemporary Western politics. One now familiar concern is how an increasing number of people determine their beliefs according to what demonstrating loyalty to their group requires instead of the facts of an independent and objective reality, as a proper concern for truthfulness demands. Whereas “they” base their beliefs on what is required to demonstrate loyalty to their group, “our” beliefs are justified by facts and evidence. Such contrasts pit loyalty and truth as necessarily antagonistic. This paper gives us further reason for thinking that putting loyalty against truthfulness at some very general or conceptual level is deeply misguided. More significantly, it seeks to show that the more helpful contrast to make is between those who are loyal to identities that value truthfulness in such a way that there are no other parts of that identity which are not revisable if they come into conflict with truth, and those who are loyal to identities that subordinate truth to other ends or goals. Acknowledging this allows us to better appreciate various aspects of how the relationship between truth and loyalty is playing out in contemporary politics. Chief among these is how our own commitment to truthfulness is itself embedded in a particular identity, an identity that we not only often fail to acknowledge as such but which necessitates us thinking harder about the ways in which it might itself sustain the dynamics of conflict and contestation, antagonizing those who do not share it and driving them farther away from the truthfulness we extol.

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Truth and Loyalty

Sleat

2023

Political Theory

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Testimony of Oppression and the Limits of Empathy

Sodoma

2024

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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Testimony of oppression is testimony that something constitutes or contributes to a form of oppression, such as, for example, “The stranger’s comment was sexist.” Testimony of oppression that is given by members of the relevant oppressed group has the potential to play an important role in fostering a shared understanding of oppression. Yet, it is frequently dismissed out of hand. Against the background of a recent debate on moral testimony, this paper discusses the following question: How should privileged hearers approach testimony of oppression if they aim to do so in an ethically and epistemically sound way? Should they defer or try to understand? Both strategies constitute ways of learning from testimony of oppression. However, they differ in important respects and exclude each other. Because testimony of oppression is often based on personal experience, empathizing with the speaker can play an important role in trying to understand testimony of oppression. While the fact that empathy can change your mind and the advantages of understanding over knowledge support trying to understand as the right approach to testimony of oppression, considerations of the “limits of empathy” and the value of deference support deferring. I argue that, on balance, these contrasting arguments allow for a limited defense of the role of empathy in learning from testimony of oppression. We should try to understand testimony of oppression by empathizing with the speaker, but not treat our ability to understand as a condition on accepting a speaker’s claim.

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An Instrumentalist Theory of Political Legitimacy

Brinkmann

2024

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This book defends instrumentalism, the claim that political legitimacy rests on promoting justice. This entails that power can be permissibly exercised without consent, democracy, or public justification. In the book’s first part, a revisionary understanding of the problem of legitimacy is defended. Legitimacy is defined as the permissibility of exercising power. This entails that the problem of legitimacy is separate from the problem of justifying political obligations. Furthermore, legitimacy can exist without political authority. Instrumentalism is described and defended in the book’s second part. The view is based on a hybrid theory of justice that recognizes both aims and constraints. The importance of justice is defended against competitor views which prioritize stability or perfection. A series of suggestions is made how instrumentalism should be formulated, in particular, that it should take a sophisticated two-level structure. The third part of the book argues against three competing theories. It is argued that consent is not necessary for legitimacy, and that strong, moral rights can be made compatible with the instrumentalist view. Proceduralist views which ground legitimacy on democracy are also rejected, but the possibility that democracy is a ‘secondary value’ within instrumentalism is explored. Lastly, it is shown that legitimacy does not rely on justifiability to reasonable people, but that legitimate governments can nonetheless accommodate disagreement in natural ways.

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In Defence of Non-Ideal Political Deference

Cited by 19 publications

References 45 publications

Truth and Loyalty

Truth and Loyalty

Testimony of Oppression and the Limits of Empathy

An Instrumentalist Theory of Political Legitimacy

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