In defence of science: Two ways to rehabilitate Reichenbach’s vindication of induction

Abstract

Confronted with the problem of induction, Hans Reichenbach accepts that we cannot justify that induction is reliable. He tries to solve the problem by proving a weaker proposition: that induction is an optimal method of prediction, because it is guaranteed not to be worse and may be better than any alternative. Regarding the most serious objection to his approach, Reichenbach himself hints at an answer without spelling it out. In this paper, I will argue that there are two workable strategies to rehabilitate Reichenbach's account. The first leads to the widely discussed method of meta-induction, as proposed by Gerhard Schurz. The second strategy has not been suggested thus far. I will develop the second strategy and argue for it being, in some respects, superior to the first and closer to Reichenbach's own position. The strategy is based on Reichenbach's idea that the inductive straight rule is not only applicable on the object but also on the method level. He does not spell out how exactly this insight is supposed to save his account. But he seems to assume that nothing more than the straight rule and the different levels of its application is needed for this purpose. The strategy introduced in this paper illustrates that this assumption is correct.