In Defence of Scientism

Ross, Don; Ladyman, James; Spurrett, David

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276196.003.0001

Cited by 30 publications

(37 citation statements)

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“…Common sense and much sophisticated theory are formulated in terms of objects. In many contexts, it is explanatorily useful to group certain things as objects, even though at the fundamental level there may not be any of them, as structural realists insist there are not (see Ladyman and Ross [2007], and French [2014]). On such accounts of fundamental theories, universals are primary and objects are, at best derivative.…”

Section: Resisting the Existence Of Categories (Of Being)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As noted above, the use of objectsas a category of fundamental entitieshas been challenged at the most fundamental level by structural realists, who question the adequacy of an object ontology for a proper understanding of the foundations of quantum mechanics (see Ladyman and Ross [2007], and French [2014]). Not surprisingly, in many instances, one needs to be prepared to make significant revisions in the conceptual framework to accommodate fundamental science, and rigid ontological categories just are not adequate for that task.…”

Section: The No-category Ontology: a Deflationary Alternativementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Maybe the adoption of a category-based ontology is simply indispensable for being a scientific realist. However, some scientific realist positions do not require a category-based ontology (consider, for instance, the various structuralist positions articulated in French [2014], Ladyman and Ross [2007], and Worrall [1989]). In the end, the shift from categories to concepts seems to pose no loss regarding our capacity to make sense of the foundations of the sciences.…”

Section: The No-category Ontology: a Deflationary Alternativementioning

confidence: 99%

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The No-Category Ontology

Bueno¹,

Busch

Shalkowski

2015

The Monist

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In this paper we argue that there are no categories of beingat least not in the robust metaphysical sense of something fundamental. Central arguments that metaphysicians provide in support of fundamental categories, such as indispensability and theoretical utility arguments, are not adequate to guarantee their existence We illustrate this point by examining Jonathan Lowe s four-category ontology, and indicating its shortcomings. In contrast, we offer an alternative, no-category ontology, which dispenses with any fundamental categories of being, and provides a deflationary understanding of any categorization in terms of concepts. Concepts, we insist, as opposed to fundamental ontological categories, can always be revised, refined, and recast. A distinctive deflationary, no-category ontology then emerges.

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Section: Resisting the Existence Of Categories (Of Being)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The No-category Ontology: a Deflationary Alternativementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The No-category Ontology: a Deflationary Alternativementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The No-Category Ontology

Bueno¹,

Busch

Shalkowski

2015

The Monist

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“…A number of recent books suggests a significant movement towards an informational universe: (Vedral) and Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics (Davies and Gregersen) to name but a few [11][12][13][14][15][16].…”

Section: Informational Nature Of Mattermentioning

confidence: 99%

Physical Computation as Dynamics of Form that Glues Everything Together

Dodig-Crnković

2012

Information

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Abstract:The framework is proposed where matter can be seen as related to energy in a way structure relates to process and information relates to computation. In this scheme matter corresponds to a structure, which corresponds to information. Energy corresponds to the ability to carry out a process, which corresponds to computation. The relationship between each two complementary parts of each dichotomous pair (matter/energy, structure/process, information/computation) are analogous to the relationship between being and becoming, where being is the persistence of an existing structure while becoming is the emergence of a new structure through the process of interactions. This approach presents a unified view built on two fundamental ontological categories: Information and computation. Conceptualizing the physical world as an intricate tapestry of protoinformation networks evolving through processes of natural computation helps to make more coherent models of nature, connecting non-living and living worlds. It presents a suitable basis for incorporating current developments in understanding of biological/cognitive/social systems as generated by complexification of physicochemical processes through self-organization of molecules into dynamic adaptive complex systems by morphogenesis, adaptation and learning -all of which are understood as information processing.

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“…This is a question about metaphysics, and the Philosophy of Information builds on metaphysical naturalism. In order to put this view into context, it is instructive to look at the critique of present day metaphysics in the book Everything Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized by Ladyman, Ross, Spurrett, and Collier [108], who propose a general "philosophy of nature" based on "ontic structural realism". The universe is "nothing but processes in structural patterns all the way down" (p. 228) "From the metaphysical point of view, what exist are just real patterns" (p. 121).…”

Section: Information-matter-energy-intelligence (Ime-i) Model States mentioning

confidence: 99%

Floridi’s “Open Problems in Philosophy of Information”, Ten Years Later

Dodig-Crnković

Hofkirchner

2011

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In his article Open Problems in the Philosophy of Information [1] LucianoFloridi presented a Philosophy of Information research program in the form of eighteen open problems, covering the following fundamental areas: Information definition, information semantics, intelligence/cognition, informational universe/nature and values/ethics. We revisit Floridi's program, highlighting some of the major advances, commenting on unsolved problems and rendering the new landscape of the Philosophy of Information (PI) emerging at present. As we analyze the progress of PI we try to situate Floridi's program in the context of scientific and technological development that have been made last ten years. We emphasize that Philosophy of Information is a huge and vibrant research field, with its origins dating before Open Problems, and its domains extending even outside their scope. In this paper, we have been able only to sketch some of the developments during the past ten years. Our hope is that, even if fragmentary, this review may serve as a contribution to the effort of understanding the present state of the art and the paths of development of Philosophy of Information as seen through the lens of Open Problems.

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In Defence of Scientism

Cited by 30 publications

References 0 publications

The No-Category Ontology

The No-Category Ontology

Physical Computation as Dynamics of Form that Glues Everything Together

Floridi’s “Open Problems in Philosophy of Information”, Ten Years Later

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