In Defense of a Kripkean Dogma

Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins; Maitra, Ishani; Weatherson, Brian

doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00478.x

Cited by 37 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Several objections have been raised against MMNS's work and subsequently been answered in the literature (for criticisms, see Ludwig 2007, Deutsch 2009, Martí 2009, Cullen 2010, Lam 2010, Ichikawa et al 2012, Devitt 2011, Devitt 2012a, and Devitt 2012b; for replies, 1 One might worry that although the difference is statistically significant, it is not very large. Indeed, according to Cohen's h, the effect size is given by h = arcsin(0.565) -arcsin(0.315) = 0.280, which would ordinarily be classified as a small effect.…”

Section: The Gödel Case and The Uniformity Conjecturementioning

confidence: 99%

Reference in the Land of the Rising Sun: A Cross-cultural Study on the Reference of Proper Names

et al. 2014

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A standard methodology in philosophy of language is to use intuitions as evidence. Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich (2004) challenged this methodology with respect to theories of reference by presenting empirical evidence that intuitions about one prominent example from the literature on the reference of proper names (Kripke's Gödel case) vary between Westerners and East Asians. In response, Sytsma and Livengood (2011) conducted experiments to show that the questions Machery and colleagues asked participants in their study were ambiguous, and that this ambiguity affected the responses given by Westerners. Sytsma and Livengood took their results to cast doubt on the claim that the current evidence indicates that there is cross-cultural variation in intuitions about the Gödel case. In this paper we report on a new cross-cultural study showing that variation in intuitions remains even after controlling for the ambiguity noted by Sytsma and Livengood.In a widely discussed article, Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich (2004, MMNS) argued that the common practice of appealing to one's own intuitions about cases as evidence for or against philosophical theories of reference is suspect. Specifically, MMNS targeted a standard justification for this practice. They noted that philosophers of language often assume that the relevant semantic intuitions are widely held and do not systematically differ across theoretically salient groups, taking such widespread agreement to indicate that the intuitions are reliable. Following Sytsma and Livengood (2011), we will refer to this assumption as the uniformity conjecture. MMNS presented empirical evidence suggesting that the uniformity conjecture is false: Intuitions about the semantic reference of a proper name in one prominent case from the literature (Kripke's Gödel case) differ in a statistically significant way between Western and East Asian cultures.

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Section: The Gödel Case and The Uniformity Conjecturementioning

confidence: 99%

Reference in the Land of the Rising Sun: A Cross-cultural Study on the Reference of Proper Names

et al. 2014

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“…Sin embargo, esas opiniones están basadas en estudios estadísticos acerca del caso Gödel-Schmidt y acerca de otro muy similar, relativo al nombre 'Jonás'. Como ya se ha señalado en la literatura (cf., por ejemplo, Ichikawa et al 2012) Machery et al (2004) se exponen los resultados de encuestas realizadas a diversos grupos de sujetos a quienes se les presentó una situación muy cercana al caso Gödel-Schmidt: el caso Gödel-Schmidt-John. Se les relató lo siguiente.…”

Section: El Caso Gödel-schmidt-johnunclassified

“…Sin embargo, la pregunta que se hizo a los encuestados en los experimentos de Machery et al (2004) bien podía ser interpretada como una cuestión sobre la referencia del hablante (cf. Ludwig 2007;Deutsch 2009;Sytsma y Livengood 2011;Ichikawa et al 2012). Quienes tomaran la pregunta en ese sentido no están manifestando ninguna intuición semántica descriptivista respecto a la referencia semántica, que es lo relevante, si optan por la respuesta A.…”

Section: El Caso Gödel-schmidt-johnunclassified

Teorías de la referencia, filosofía experimental y calibración de intuiciones

Otero

2017

THEORIA

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RESUMEN: E. Machery y algunos colaboradores suyos han utilizado datos sobre encuestas para criticar el anti-descriptivismo sobre los nombres propios de Kripke. Presento aquí diversos inconvenientes de esas encuestas. Algunas de mis objeciones conciernen a su ambigüedad. En particular, las respuestas que -según Machery et al.-revelan intuiciones descriptivistas pueden interpretarse como respuestas anti-descriptivistas, por razones que -por lo que yo sé-nadie ha destacado hasta ahora. Además, los casos presentados a los encuestados son aparentemente inconsistentes. También abordo otras cuestiones relacionadas con el papel de las intuiciones en la filosofía; las tesis de Machery et al. dependen de un supuesto injustificado: no existen capacidades expertas respecto a las intuiciones.Palabras clave: Kripke; Machery; descriptivismo; capacidades expertas; nombres propios; semántica inter-cultural; experimentos mentales; justificación empírica.ABSTRACT: E. Machery and some collaborators have used survey data to criticize Kripke's anti-descriptivism about proper names. I highlight a number of drawbacks in the tests of Machery et al. Some of my objections concern their ambiguity. In particular, the responses that -according to them-reveal descriptivist intuitions can be interpreted as anti-descriptivist responses, for reasons that -as far as I know-have not been pointed out so far. Furthermore, their vignettes are apparently inconsistent. I also discuss other issues related to the role of intuitions in philosophy; Machery et al.'s theses depend on an unjustified assumption: there is not expertise regarding intuitions.

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“…Nor is it necessarily the case that undermining Kripke's appeals to intuition does irreparable harm to his broader arguments (Ichikawa et al, 2011, Devitt, 2011 indefinitely (e.g., Columbus as 'the first European to discover the Americas'), descriptivism can (and likely does) make false predictions about the reference of a large swath of names.…”

Section: Kripke's Intuitions and The Experimental Challengementioning

confidence: 99%

Interpreting intuition: Experimental philosophy of language

Maynes¹

2013

Philosophical Psychology

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In Defense of a Kripkean Dogma

Cited by 37 publications

References 9 publications

Reference in the Land of the Rising Sun: A Cross-cultural Study on the Reference of Proper Names

Reference in the Land of the Rising Sun: A Cross-cultural Study on the Reference of Proper Names

Teorías de la referencia, filosofía experimental y calibración de intuiciones

Interpreting intuition: Experimental philosophy of language

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