What Is a Person? 1988
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4612-3950-5_4
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In Defense of Abortion and Infanticide

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Cited by 34 publications
(30 citation statements)
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“…Theorists have variously seized on many of these to offer accounts of the grounds of moral status. These include possession of self-consciousness ( Tooley 1972 ), possession of sophisticated psychological capacities ( McMahan 2002 ), possession of 'typical human capacities' ( DiSilvestro 2010 ), possession of the capacity to participate in a 'person-rearing relationship' ( Jaworska and Tennenbaum 2014 ), possession of a capacity for intentional agency ( Sebo 2017 ), the ability to take oneself to be an end rather than a mere means in the sense that one can experience and pursue what is good for one ( Korsgaard 2013 ), the capacity to suffer ( Bentham 1996 ), possession of the genetic basis for moral agency ( Liao 2010 ), and no doubt more. Of course some of these are friendlier to entities outside the tight circle of healthy adult humans, and some are not.…”
Section: Moral Statusmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Theorists have variously seized on many of these to offer accounts of the grounds of moral status. These include possession of self-consciousness ( Tooley 1972 ), possession of sophisticated psychological capacities ( McMahan 2002 ), possession of 'typical human capacities' ( DiSilvestro 2010 ), possession of the capacity to participate in a 'person-rearing relationship' ( Jaworska and Tennenbaum 2014 ), possession of a capacity for intentional agency ( Sebo 2017 ), the ability to take oneself to be an end rather than a mere means in the sense that one can experience and pursue what is good for one ( Korsgaard 2013 ), the capacity to suffer ( Bentham 1996 ), possession of the genetic basis for moral agency ( Liao 2010 ), and no doubt more. Of course some of these are friendlier to entities outside the tight circle of healthy adult humans, and some are not.…”
Section: Moral Statusmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(Engelhardt 2000: xii) Engelhardt provoserer ved å trekke frem forbudet mot spedbarnsdrap som eksempel på et tabu som ikke lar seg begrunne i sekulaer bioetikk. Men også noen ateistiske filosofer er enige med ham i at sett ut fra Vestens liberale abortpraksis, må dette forbudet ses på nettopp som et ubegrunnet tabu (Giubilini & Minerva 2013;Tooley 1972).…”
Section: Avvisning Av Unntaksløse Moralske Forbudunclassified
“…For debilitating, painful of life-limiting diseases, NS, or 'gene therapy' (GT) is an attractive technology because it prevents suffering of the unborn child and distress of the parents (Abraham, 2012;Glover, 1984). It is also supported by a variety of bioethicists according to various theories (Tooley, 1972;Purdy, 1996;Thompson, 1971;; Singer, 1974), but both NS and PS (called 'genetic enhancement' or GE) of embryos likely resonates best with the bioliberalism philosophymore specifically, a subset of bioliberalism, called transhumanism. Transhumanists argue that genetic selection of embryos could benefit the future individual by improving physical wellbeing, intelligence, emotional stability and resiliency to stressors.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%