In Defense of Convergent Realism

Hardin, C. L.; Rosenberg, Alexander

doi:10.1086/289080

Cited by 199 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…It is not at all clear that this appeal to Kripke/Putnam-style theories of reference would in fact help the entity realist (see, e.g., Hardin and Rosenberg 1982;Laudan 1984;Chakravartty 2007, Chap. 2).…”

Section: Entities Properties Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Entity realism and singularist semirealism

Nánay

2016

Synthese

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Entity realism is the view that 'a good many theoretical entities do really exist'. The main novelty of entity realism was that it provided an account of scientific realism that did not have to endorse realism about theories-the general proposal was that entity realism is noncommittal about whether we should be realist about scientific theories. I argue that the only way entity realists can resist the pull of straight scientific realism about theories is by endorsing a recent new player in the scientific realism debate: singularist semirealism.

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Section: Entities Properties Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Entity realism and singularist semirealism

Nánay

2016

Synthese

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“…The causal theory of reference was central to Hilary Putnam's post-positivist development of scientific realism and is still central to many scientific realist responses to the pessimistic meta-induction, such as Hardin and Rosenberg [9]. This is an example of how objective modality may be a commitment incurred by some realists not in virtue of their realism but in virtue of their arguments for it (see §2.2 below).…”

Section: Scientific Realism and Objective Modalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If we are in a world in which the regularity holds eternally, then our final system will be one in which the regularity is an axiom or theorem. 9 If we are in a world in which the regularity is only temporary, the final system will not include it. We cannot know which system is the accurate description of our world until all the facts about our world are in.…”

Section: Laws In the Special Sciencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ontic Structural Realism and Modality

Berenstain

Ladyman

2011

Structural Realism

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“…-it is clear that while truth cannot be divorced from reference as some advocates of causal reference seem to intend (see e.g. Hardin & Rosenberg 1982), at the same time, it is obvious that some mechanism other than, or at least in addition to, truth is needed to accommodate the fluidity of science. This is what naturalised realism offers.…”

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confidence: 99%

Re-enchanting Realism in Debate with Kyle Stanford

Ruttkamp-Bloem

2013

J Gen Philos Sci

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In this article, against the background of a notion of 'assembled' truth, the evolutionary progressiveness of a theory is suggested as novel and promising explanation for the success of science. A new version of realism in science, referred to as 'naturalised realism' is outlined. Naturalised realism is 'fallibilist' in the unique sense that it captures and mimics the self-corrective core of scientific knowledge and its progress. It is argued that naturalised realism disarms Kyle Stanford's anti-realist 'new induction' threats by showing that 'explanationism' and his 'epistemic instrumentalism' are just two positions among many on a constantly evolving continuum of options between instrumentalism and full-blown realism. In particular it is demonstrated that not only can naturalised realism redefine the terms of realist debate in such a way that no talk of miracles need enter the debate, but it also promises interesting defenses against inductive-and under-determination-based anti-realist arguments.Keywords: Realism, evolutionary progressiveness, continuity, reference, truth, unconceived alternatives IntroductionIn this article a new version of realism in science is outlined that does more justice to our current understanding of the functioning of science and its history than either traditional scientific realism or instrumentalism can do. The proposed version of realism, referred to as 'naturalised realism', is 'fallibilist' in the unique sense that it captures and mimics the self-corrective core of scientific knowledge and its progress. This view may sound like a pessimistic meta-inductivist's dream, but actually this is so only if one evaluates it from within a traditional no-miracles kind of realism. Naturalised realism highlights some of the limitations of dealing with issues of realism in a traditional 'nomiracles' (Putnam 1975, 73), or 'explanationist' (Stanford 2006, context within which approximate truth is presented as the reason for the success of science. Specifically it is shown here that one of the most notable recent attacks on explanationist realism, namely Kyle Stanford's new induction argument, is powerful specifically because he works within explanationist assumptions. Naturalised realism turns on a complex evolutionary view of scientific progress within which Stanford's anti-realist threats are disarmed, not only because of approaching such threats in 2 non-explanationist terms, but mainly because 'explanationism' and Stanford's 'epistemic instrumentalism' are shown to be just two positions among many on a constantly evolving continuum of options between instrumentalism and realism.The article is set out as follows: In section 2 the framework of the current realist/anti-realist debate is briefly set out. This section does not give a full evaluation of explanationism (or of other versions of realism) or even of possible explanationist answers to naturalised realism. The focus is rather on outlining points of difference between some core features of explanationism and those of naturalise...

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In Defense of Convergent Realism

Cited by 199 publications

References 2 publications

Entity realism and singularist semirealism

Entity realism and singularist semirealism

Ontic Structural Realism and Modality

Re-enchanting Realism in Debate with Kyle Stanford

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