In defense of deception.

Deception in Experiments: Revisiting the Arguments in Its Defense

“…If so, one may expect the behavior in experiments of participants who suspect foul play to differ from those who do not. Based on his review of the literature, Kimmel (1998), however, arrived at a different conclusion. In his view, "the effects of suspiciousness on research performance, although somewhat inconsistent, appear to be negligible, leading some to conclude that, in general, there are not major differences between the data of suspicious and reportedly naïve participants" (p. 804).…”

“…More recently, Kimmel (1998) concluded that the "preponderance of evidence suggests that deceived participants do not become resentful about having been DECEPTION IN EXPERIMENTS fooled by researchers" (p. 804). According to Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, resentment is "a feeling of indignant displeasure or persistent ill will at something regarded as a wrong, insult, or injury" (p. 1059).…”

“…For several reasons, we do not think so. For one, those who defend the use of deception in psychology (e.g., Kimmel, 1998), or make the case for its use in experimental economics (Bonetti, 1998a(Bonetti, , 1998b typically justify their arguments with reference to this evidence.…”

“…Deception has been defended as an indispensable strategy of last resort for the study of those facets of behavior that are of great social importance and for which DECEPTION IN EXPERIMENTS alternative research methods either are unavailable or would produce invalid data (e.g., Bröder, 1998;Kimmel, 1998;Korn, 1998;Weiss, 2001). By this argument, the costs of not conducting such research (e.g., on conformity, obedience, racial stereotypes, bystander effect, and aggression) outweigh the costs of using deception (e.g., Trice, 1986).…”

“…Our comments prompted responses from several researchers: Bröder (1998), Kimmel (1998), Korn (1998), and Weiss (2001). Four arguments featured prominently in their defense of deception: (a) the use of deception has, after an increase in the 1960s and 1970s, dropped (e.g., Korn); (b) "the preponderance of evidence suggests that deceived participants do not become resentful about having been fooled by researchers" (Kimmel,p.…”