In search of lost time: Integrated information theory needs constraints from temporal phenomenology

Abstract

Integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness proposes an identity between its causal structure and phenomenology. Through this assertion, IIT aims to explain consciousness by prioritizing first-person experience. However, despite its phenomenology-first stance, developments in IIT have overlooked temporality. As such, we argue that at present IIT’s phenomenological analysis is incomplete. In this critique, we show how IIT takes a non-identical illusionist stance towards the experiences of continuity, flow, and extent of our experiences. Moreover, in isolating temporal grains of experience to a single timescale, IIT misses out on capturing the multi-scale nested nature of temporal phenomena. Hence, we contend that IIT needs an axiom for time, through which its causal structure can be refined to account for temporal experiences. Here, we propose an axiom to address these concerns. We conclude by discussing how IIT may need to be revised if our concerns hold true.

Just one moment: Unifying theories of consciousness based on a phenomenological “now” and temporal hierarchy.

“…Thus, our aim here is not to critique 8 theories on their limitations (or argue one is correct while others are not) but rather highlight how their coming together can help us understand consciousness. It should also be kept in mind that, while we can focus on any one theory and their attempt in handling temporal properties in greater detail (see Singhal et al, 2022, for an example with respect to IIT), here our scope is broader and covers six theories.…”

“…According to IIT, this timescale is at which experience is maximally irreducible, that is, the timescale at which “the relevant physical elements lead to the conceptual structure having the highest value of Φ, as opposed to finer or coarser grains (for example, hundred milliseconds rather than a millisecond or ten seconds)” (Tononi, 2015). At present, IIT thus ignores the possibility of different phenomenological properties evolving simultaneously over different timescales (see Singhal et al, 2022, for a criticism). However, if one traces the genealogy of IIT, one can see how IIT has shifted its stance on the expanse of its temporal grain.…”

“…With different course graining, the duration usually clusters around 10–100 ms, 250–500 ms, and a few seconds. We previously used exactly this clustering to show how these timescales individually reflect different phenomenological regularities (see Singhal et al, 2022; Singhal & Srinivasan, 2021).…”

“…We have previously criticized IIT for entirely ignoring temporal phenomenology, despite being a phenomenology-first theory (Singhal et al, 2022). This minimal model of time consciousness allows mechanisms drawn from IIT to not only contribute to consciousness studies but also revise its inner workings to maintain its commitments to phenomenology.…”

Editorial: Insights in consciousness research 2021

“…Amongst the prominent current theories of consciousness is the integrated information theory (IIT: Oizumi et al, 2014 ), which depends on measures of complexity (Arsiwalla and Verschure, 2018 ). There have been multiple criticisms of IIT [see Singhal et al ( 2022 ) for a criticism based on temporal phenomenology]. The paper by Koculak and Wierzchoń argues that the focus of those studying the theoretical and empirical basis of IIT has been primarily on the states of consciousness and not directly on the contents of consciousness itself.…”