In the beginning was the doing: the premises of the practical syllogism

Wiland, Eric

doi:10.1080/00455091.2013.857139

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 13 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Even if actions-in-progress support the idea that goals can in some sense be actual before being attained, they positively count against the idea that they are that-ish. Small surprise, then, that their champions are either silent on the question of whether goals can be reasons (Wiland 2013)or they lend succor to pluralism. Thus Thompson (2008, ch.…”

Section: And the Questionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pluralism about practical reasons and reason explanations

Glock

Schmidt

2021

Philosophical Explorations

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper maintains that objectivism about practical reasons should be combined with pluralism both about the nature of practical reasons and about action explanations. We argue for an 'expanding circle of practical reasons', starting out from an openminded monist objectivism. On this view, practical reasons are not limited to actual facts, but consist in states of affairs, possible facts that may or may not obtain. Going beyond such 'that-ish' reasons, we argue that goals are also bona fide practical reasons. This makes for a genuine pluralism about practical reasons. Furthermore, the facts or states of affairs that function as practical reasons are not exclusively natural or descriptive, but include normative facts. That normative facts can be reasons justifies a pluralism about reason explanations, one which allows for what we call enkratic explanations in addition to teleological ones.

show abstract

Section: And the Questionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pluralism about practical reasons and reason explanations

Glock

Schmidt

2021

Philosophical Explorations

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…37. For a conception of the practical syllogism in terms of naïve rationalizations, see Wiland (2013).…”

Section: Practical Reasoning and The Goodmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anscombe on Practical Knowledge and the Good

Frey¹

2019

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper addresses how Elizabeth Anscombe understands the link between action theory and ethics, by focusing on her theory of practical knowledge. I argue that, for Anscombe, a capacity for practical knowledge is best understood as a capacity to do things for reasons, where reasons are the ends pursued by the agent as practically intelligible goods; on this view, knowing what one is doing and knowing the intended good of doing it are two different aspects of one and the same practical knowledge. On my reading of Anscombe, the central task of action theory is to elucidate this capacity for practical knowledge, which is exercised anytime one acts in the characteristically human way (intentionally or voluntarily). The proper task of ethics, by contrast, is to elucidate the perfected exercise of this power in the practically wise or virtuous person-i.e., the one who is properly disposed to act for the right reasons and thus lives well.

show abstract

“…1 On the leading alternative to causalism, which I will label 'Aristotelianism' in light of its alleged source, practical reasoning can constitutively involve bodily action (e.g. Tenenbaum, 2007;Thompson, 2008;Wiland, 2013). This is understood as a matter of nonmental events featuring as constituents of such reasoning.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Reasoning's relation to bodily action

Jenkins

2020

Ratio

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Recent philosophical work on the relation between reasoning and bodily action is dominated by two views. It is orthodox to have it that bodily actions can be at most causally involved in reasoning. Others have it that reasoning can constitutively involve bodily actions, where this is understood as a matter of non-mental bodily events featuring as constituents of practical reasoning. Reflection on cases of reasoning out-loud suggests a neglected alternative on which both practical and theoretical reasoning can have bodily actions as constituents, where such bodily actions themselves amount to contentful mental events. Furthermore, the natural lines of resistance to this view trade on type-token errors, or on a questionable common-factor assumption. KEYWORDS action, disjunctivism, Gilbert Ryle, practical reasoning, reasoning, thinking out-loud Causalism and AristotelianismReasoning is a distinctive kind of aim-directed process with constituent events. In particular, reasoning is a kind of aim-directed thinking (McHugh & Way, 2018). Suppose that one is reasoning about whether p, for instance. To do so is to engage in thinking in order to work out/figure out/determine whether p. If one works out/figures out/determines whether p by engaging in such reasoning then one has achieved one's aim, otherwise not. Such reasoning will have constituent events such as judgments, inferences and acts of supposition. One might reason about whether p by first supposing that p, then by inferring q, for instance, such that the latter events qualify as constituents of the aim-directed process which is one's reasoning.Everyone should agree that our bodily actions can affect the course of our reasoning. It is a familiar fact that taking a stroll can affect what occurs to you as you work through a problem, for example. Everyone should likewise agree that there is a sense in which reasoning can issue in bodily action. Reasoning about what to do might bring to light what the best course of action is, for instance, and lead to one's acting accordingly. But can the relation between reasoning and bodily action be more intimate than it is revealed to be by

show abstract

In the beginning was the doing: the premises of the practical syllogism

Cited by 5 publications

References 13 publications

Pluralism about practical reasons and reason explanations

Pluralism about practical reasons and reason explanations

Anscombe on Practical Knowledge and the Good

Reasoning's relation to bodily action

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About