In the Shadow of Democracy Promotion

Abstract

International efforts to promote democracy can have unanticipated effects. International election observation is perceived to increase domestic confidence in the electoral process and reduce fraud. Conversely, election boycotts are perceived to be more likely as electoral fairness decreases. The authors document a puzzling relationship between monitored elections and opposition party boycotts: Observers are associated with an increased boycott probability. They argue that international benefits for democratic elections give electoral autocrats the incentive to invite international observers and manipulate elections to minimize international criticism. This increase in “strategic manipulation” has led to changed incentives for opposition political parties, which have the most to lose from a manipulated but internationally certified election. Consequently, international monitors increase boycott probability. The authors support this explanation with an original data set of elections, boycotts, and international observers (1990 to 2002).

Partisan Poll Watchers and Electoral Manipulation

“…This paper is also closely related to the literature that studies election monitoring (Beaulieu and Hyde 2009; Brancati 2014; Cantú and García-Ponce 2015; Casas, Díaz, and Trindade 2017; Chernykh and Svolik 2015; Hyde 2007; Hyde and Marinov 2014; Ichino and Schundeln 2012; Kelley 2012; Simpser and Donno 2012). Although we present evidence of the importance of partisan monitors for electoral outcomes that is in line with previous findings, our goal is to use these estimates to inform the study of the level of monitoring chosen by parties with a focus on interparty strategic considerations.…”

Does aid support democracy? A systematic review of the literature

“…When expanded to include democracy aid and its constituent subcategories-participation/civil society aid, election aid, legislative and political party aid, media and information aid, and human rights aid-29 studies find a positive impact (e.g., Uberti and Jackson 2019;von Borzyskowski 2019), whereas 11 studies find a negative impact (e.g. Beaulieu and Hyde 2009). Only three studies singularly analyse one subcategory of democracy aid (Beaulieu and Hyde 2009;Shyrokykh 2017;Uberti and Jackson 2019); all the others address democracy aid subcategories in conjunction with other types of aid.…”

“…Beaulieu and Hyde 2009). Only three studies singularly analyse one subcategory of democracy aid (Beaulieu and Hyde 2009;Shyrokykh 2017;Uberti and Jackson 2019); all the others address democracy aid subcategories in conjunction with other types of aid.…”

The Unintended Consequences of Democracy Promotion: International Organizations and Democratic Backsliding

“…The intense emphasis international actors place on free and fair elections has rendered elections a condition for receiving international material benefits (Hyde, 2011). Therefore, executives have incentives to refrain from manipulating elections to maintain power; instead, they resort to more subtle tactics, such as “strategically manipulating” elections by interfering with nonelectoral institutions (Beaulieu & Hyde, 2009).…”