“…As New York Court of Appeals Judge Titone pointed out, dissenting in People v. Scalza (1990, p. 18), a case unsuccessfully challenging the New York law in the context of a suppression-of-evidence hearing, “The impairment can hardly be characterized as de minimis , since the vast majority of suppression determinations involve, as the primary fact-finding task, an assessment of the conflicting witnesses’ truthfulness.” 2 Second, with specific reference to pretrial suppression of evidence hearings, the task of weighing and appraisal of testimony—an especially significant aspect of such hearings—is transferred to those who were never selected to be judges (in New York’s case, by the voters, a format followed in about three quarters of all states, see Deja, 1996). 3 Third, they violate the basic tenets of therapeutic jurisprudence, that teaches us that “legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process principles” (Perlin & Lynch, 2016, p. 348).…”