In View of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and Domestic Constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference

Abstract

The bargaining product of the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference—the Amsterdam Treaty—dwindled down the draft proposal to a consensus set of all fifteen member states of the European Union (EU). Using the two-level concept of international bargains, we provide a thorough analysis of how this consensus set was reached by issue subtraction with respect to domestic ratification constraints. Drawing on data sets covering the positions of all negotiating actors and ratifying national political parties, we first highlight the differences in the Amsterdam ratification procedures in the fifteen member states of the EU. This analysis allows us to compare the varying ratification difficulties in each country. Second, our empirical analysis of the treaty negotiations shows that member states excluded half of the Amsterdam bargaining issues to secure a smooth ratification. Because member states with higher domestic ratification constraints performed better in eliminating uncomfortable issues at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference, issue subtraction can be explained by the extent to which the negotiators were constrained by domestic interests.

Public perceptions of the EU as a system of governance

“…Weßels (1995) has argued that due to the complexity of the EU project and distal proximity from the daily lives of individuals, the role of intermediaries is a necessary inclusion, such that evaluations of the role of national political elites led many to conclude that support for continued EU integration was largely an elite-driven process. There is a distinction between EU and national elites (Thomassen and Schmitt 1997) and various analyses show that most elites support European integration to a greater degree than mass publics, such as EU parliamentarians (Schmitt and Thomassen 2000) and governmental elites (Hug and König 2002;Aspinwall 2002). Yes, on the whole, popular attitudes regarding the EU are typically considered to be mediated or even manufactured through the attitudes of national and EU elites (Anderson 1998;Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren 1994a); a premise that is increasingly contested (see below).…”

Exploring the Schelling conjecture in reverse

“…These factions might influence elites directly (lobbying), but frequently do so by engaging the broader public (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). I focus on the broad public, assuming that leaders' perceptions of public opinion serve as a domestic constraint that may function much as institutional constraints (particularly legislatures) featured much more prominently in the literature (Hug and Konig, 2002). While previous research indicates international regimes can change behavior even absent coercive capabilities (Gilligan, 2006), they almost always need an internal ally to ensure implementation by elites consumed by a desire to maintain power.…”

Public perceptions of the EU as a system of governance

“…Weßels (1995) has argued that due to the complexity of the EU project and distal proximity from the daily lives of individuals, the role of intermediaries is a necessary inclusion, such that evaluations of the role of national political elites led many to conclude that support for continued EU integration was largely an elite-driven process. There is a distinction between EU and national elites (Thomassen and Schmitt 1997) and various analyses show that most elites support European integration to a greater degree than mass publics, such as EU parliamentarians (Schmitt and Thomassen 2000) and governmental elites (Hug and König 2002;Aspinwall 2002). Yes, on the whole, popular attitudes regarding the EU are typically considered to be mediated or even manufactured through the attitudes of national and EU elites (Anderson 1998;Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren 1994a); a premise that is increasingly contested (see below).…”