Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms

You, Jung S.; Juárez, Rubén

doi:10.1007/s00199-021-01342-z

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Given the principal-agent relationship prevalent in society [ 44 ], agents usually have more information than principals, which generates an incentive problem. However, the agent’s information superiority situation leads to efficient, fair, and incentive-compatible properties that are prone to be in conflict [ 45 ], making early research results argue for the fundamental impossibility of mechanism design [ 46 , 47 ]. With the development of research techniques and methods, scholars have made more attempts in resolving the aforementioned incentive conflicts.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive-compatible mechanism for manufacturing carbon emission supervision under carbon control policies in China

Liang,

Lv,

Zhao

2024

PLoS ONE

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Enhance performance in manufacturing carbon emission (MCE) reduction has become a widespread consensus and a necessary part, which cannot be achieved without the joint participation of manufacturing enterprises and supervisory departments. Accordingly, how to coordinate the interests of both sides and design a reasonable incentive-compatible mechanism becomes an urgent task at present. Considering the two subsidy funding channels of peer funds and government finance, this study applies the evolutionary game model to analyze feasible schemes for designing incentive-compatible mechanism of MCE supervision, discusses and simulates the realistic scenarios and influencing factors of incentive-compatible mechanism under the non-subsidized and subsidized schemes. The results show that MCE supervision is in an incentive-incompatible state under the non-subsidized incentive scheme, while in a constrained incentive-compatible state under the subsidized incentive scheme. With the increase of peer funds and penalty coefficient or the decrease of subsidy coefficient, the period of MCE supervision to reach an incentive-compatible state becomes shorter. However, a lower peer fund and penalty coefficient or a higher subsidy coefficient will contribute to a state of incentive-incompatible or a periodic cycle state of "incentive-compatible → incentive-incompatible →incentive-compatible→…" in the MCE supervision.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive-compatible mechanism for manufacturing carbon emission supervision under carbon control policies in China

Liang,

Lv,

Zhao

2024

PLoS ONE

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“…Since we have a convex consumption space, it seems reasonable the we should have convex option sets, and so beyond this requirement, continuity really imposes that one's influence upon another be continuous. You and Juarez (2021) provide background literature on the question of simplicity for the design of allocation mechanisms for divisible goods.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simple Social Choice Rules for Exchange

Tierney

2021

SSRN Journal

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We study the classical problem of trade in two-dimensional Euclidean space. It is known that there is no efficient rule for this model that is compatible with dominant strategy incentives, that is, there is no efficient and strategy-proof rule. We observe that, in addition to incentive constraints, informational constraints are also unavoidable for social planners. Thus, we impose the requirement that finite dimensional messages be sufficient information to realize a rule. In addition, we impose the minimal fairness axioms of anonymity and a weakening of non-bossiness, as well as continuity. The result is a class of rules that is similar to those characterized by Barberà and Jackson ["Strategy-proof exchange", Econometrica, 63 (1995), 51-87].

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Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences

Gong,

Dietzenbacher,

Peters

2024

Econ Theory

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A mechanism allocates one unit of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents reporting a number between zero and one. Nash, Pareto optimal Nash, and strong equilibria are analyzed for the case where the agents have single-dipped preferences. One main result is that when the mechanism satisfies anonymity, monotonicity, the zero–one property, and order preservation, then the Pareto optimal Nash and strong equilibria coincide and result in Pareto optimal allocations that are characterized by so-called maximal coalitions: members of a maximal coalition prefer an equal coalition share over obtaining zero, whereas the outside agents prefer zero over obtaining an equal share from joining the coalition. A second main result is an axiomatic characterization of the associated social choice correspondence as the maximal correspondence satisfying minimal envy Pareto optimality, equal division lower bound, and sharing index order preservation.

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Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms

Cited by 3 publications

References 31 publications

Incentive-compatible mechanism for manufacturing carbon emission supervision under carbon control policies in China

Incentive-compatible mechanism for manufacturing carbon emission supervision under carbon control policies in China

Simple Social Choice Rules for Exchange

Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences

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