Incentive contracting when boards have related industry expertise

Nanda, Vikram; Onal, Bunyamin

doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.08.014

Cited by 10 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 46 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…(4) Combine management efficiency and management effect: different from traditional enterprise management, modern management theory emphasizes that the management efficiency of the enterprise should be combined with the management effect of the organization. e goals or objectives of management show a diversified trend, which are to realize the performance management of the enterprise [9]. e core of performance management has three modules, as shown in Figure 1.…”

Section: Combine Contemporary System Management Eory Withmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enterprise Performance Optimization Management Decision-Making and Coordination Mechanism Based on Multiobjective Optimization

Zou

Bai

2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Today’s society is a society of the knowledge economy, and the competition of enterprises is the competition of talents. The rapid development of science and technology and the fierce development of market competition have made the importance of performance management increasingly prominent in corporate management. The purpose of performance management is to explore and deal with some of the effects of various factors on employee performance and to tap the potential of employees, improve employee performance, and also bring a qualitative leap to the performance of the organization. The improvement of the employee performance management level has laid a solid foundation for the improvement of the organizational performance management level. However, there are still some difficulties in the implementation of performance management in my country at this stage, and the management effect is not obvious. Therefore, building a scientific, reasonable, and complete multiobjective optimization-based corporate performance optimization management decision-making and coordination mechanism is the primary task of today’s enterprises. This article will give a brief theoretical overview of the combination of system management theory and behavior management theory, MBO target management, and KPI indicators, build a multiobjective optimization model on an effective theoretical basis, and use genetic algorithms to obtain a weak Pareto effective solution that can optimize the enterprise with consideration of performance appraisal indicators. It also builds an agency model and an analysis of employee incentive plans, which clearly shows the relationship between the company and the management and employees, conducts a cross analysis of the needs of the company’s management and employees, and puts forward the best corporate performance considering the needs of employees; among them, the multiobjective optimization of corporate performance increased by 14% under the optimal management decision.

show abstract

Section: Combine Contemporary System Management Eory Withmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enterprise Performance Optimization Management Decision-Making and Coordination Mechanism Based on Multiobjective Optimization

Zou

Bai

2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Though some researchers (Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 2000;Fitza, 2014;Manner, 2010;Shen & Cannella Jr, 2002;Zhang & Qu, 2016) have reiterated that the attributes of CEOs are necessary for the firm's performance, but the survival of the novel CEO relies on his interaction with top management members and among top management team whereas the role of independent directors is pivotal. The prior research (Nanda & Onal, 2016)has witnessed that their vigilant presence is necessary for boosting the firms' growth. It has also been observed that under the surveillance of independent directors, top management turnover positively enhances the firms' growth (Shen & Lin, 2009).…”

Section: Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Whether CEO Succession Via Hierarchical Jumps is Detrimental or Blessing in Disguise? Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

Shah

Sarfraz

Fareed

et al. 2019

Zagreb International Review of Economics and Business

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study investigates the impact of hierarchical jumps in the CEO’s succession on firms’ financial performance. To contemplate deeply, hierarchical jumps have been categorized into high and low level evaluating the positive impact of high-level hierarchical jump on firms’ performance. Moreover, this study has also formulated hierarchical intensity signifying the idea that despite neglecting senior board members during hierarchical jumps, still marginal increment in the firms’ growth has been observed. Using panel regression technique along with 2sls instrumental regression, this research reveals that hierarchical jumps in CEOs successions are more conducive only if the incumbent CEOs are selected irrespective of age, degree or high hierarchical position within the hierarchical ladder. Lastly, this study enunciates that firms having high total assets boost their performance via hierarchical jumps emphatically.

show abstract

“…Academic education and background of board members represent their participation in socio-economic areas and illustrate their capabilities in development and growth of external business activities (Collins, 1971;Pfeffer, 1972;Hillman & Dalziel, 2003;Stevenson & Radin, 2009). Nanda & Onal (2016) came to a conclusion that various methods for paying bonus will be applied and less stock-based compensations are paid when there are expert managers in different industries, and also when they are aware of environmental issues of the industries. Of course, there have always been various criteria for gauging managers' education level from "unskilled worker" to "professor" (Almus, 2002), "college education" to "higher education" (Barringer et al, 2005), and "primary school" to "long higher education" (Senderovitz et al, 2016).…”

Section: Education Level and Degreementioning

confidence: 99%

Board compensation and disclosure quality: corporate governance interference

Salehi¹,

Jamalikazemini²,

Farhangdoust

2018

CyA

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper investigates the impact of financial information disclosure quality on board compensation in various corporate governance mechanisms in Iran. A unique data set from a sample of 176 Iranian listed firms over the period 2010-2016 is used in order to address the following questions: as an incentive mechanism for managers, is there any relationship between compensation and disclosure quality of financial information while some corporate governance factors are interfered? Duality on board, educated members, females, and independent members are the aspects that are considered as corporate governance interference. Along with these issues, we investigate whether firm complexity is likely to affect the mentioned relationship. We find that corporate governance mechanisms including educated board members, independent members, females, and board members duality are not some reward-enhancing methods. This lends support to the conjecture that directors neglect the quality of information they provide, and as a consequence, they adjust their bonuses via other methods. Our findings indicate that there is a significant and positive relationship between board compensation and disclosure quality in firms which have complex activities and foreign sales. Finally, we indicate that disclosure quality has no significant impact on compensation in firms which have complex activity of controlling some subsidiaries.

show abstract

Incentive contracting when boards have related industry expertise

Cited by 10 publications

References 46 publications

Enterprise Performance Optimization Management Decision-Making and Coordination Mechanism Based on Multiobjective Optimization

Enterprise Performance Optimization Management Decision-Making and Coordination Mechanism Based on Multiobjective Optimization

Whether CEO Succession Via Hierarchical Jumps is Detrimental or Blessing in Disguise? Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

Board compensation and disclosure quality: corporate governance interference

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About