Incentive Design for Noncooperative Dynamical Systems Under Sustainable Budget Constraint For Pareto Improvement

Yan, Yuyue; Hayakawa, Tomohisa

doi:10.23919/acc53348.2022.9867467

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Different from the preliminary version [41], this paper additionally provides more illustrative and important numerical examples, detailed proofs, and elaborated literature review. Furthermore, more discussions are added in Section IV where we discuss the Pareto-improving incentive mechanism and the connection between Pareto improvement and potentialization with equal priority.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Pareto-Improving Incentive Mechanism for Noncooperative Dynamical Systems Under Sustainable Budget Constraint

Yan,

Hayakawa

2024

IEEE Trans. Automat. Contr.

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A Pareto-improving incentive mechanism to improve the weighted social welfare and achieve continual Pareto improvement for a pseudo-gradient-based noncooperative dynamical system is developed. In the proposed approach, the system manager remodels agents' dynamical decision making by collecting taxes from some agents and giving some of the collected taxes to other agents as subsidies with a sustainable budget constraint. Sufficient conditions are derived under which agents' state converges towards the socially maximum state associated with a weighted social welfare function depending on the priority ratio of the agents and the initial state. We present several illustrative numerical examples to illustrate the efficacy of our results and reveal the fact that the potentialization of the payoff structure has a very strong relation to generating Pareto-improving system trajectories.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Noting that Γ is nonsingular, rank([Π, ξ]) = rank(Γ[Π, ξ]) holds. Therefore, rank([Π, ξ]) = rank(Π) = n − 2 ifand only if ξ1 = 0, which corresponds to(41).…”

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confidence: 99%