Incentive for innovation and the optimal allocation of patents

Abstract

This article theoretically investigates how different ownership structures of patents affect ex ante and ex post incentives for innovation by applying a property rights approach. We explore a model in which two research laboratories invest in R&D to obtain an innovative patent, and after successfully obtaining the patent they determine an ownership structure for the patent. The two parties consider how the determined patent ownership would affect their noncontractible relation-specific investments for commercialisation. We demonstrate that joint ownership of a patent between two parties is optimal. More concretely, if a selfish (altruistic) relation-specific investment is more important than an altruistic (selfish) investment, a joint ownership with no (bilateral) veto is optimal to maximise the joint value. Moreover, when both parties do not commit themselves to joint ownership in advance, they have greater incentive to invest in R&D than committing, even if they understand that joint ownership is desirable ex post.

Conducting systematic literature reviews and bibliometric analyses

“…Figure 6 essentially provides a ‘heat map’ that details which topics were of interest in a particular year. For instance, the topic, ‘Research and Development’ (R&D) became prominent in 2017 and 2018. Articles have looked at R&D valuation (Chen et al, 2018), investments in R&D (Hamada, 2017) and market orientation (Bucic et al, 2017).…”

“…For instance, the topic, ‘Research and Development’ (R&D) became prominent in 2017 and 2018. Articles have looked at R&D valuation (Chen et al, 2018), investments in R&D (Hamada, 2017) and market orientation (Bucic et al, 2017). Other topics that have recently attracted attention in the AJM include research on the board of directors as well as decision making with regard to investments (He et al, 2018; Hutcheson and Newell, 2018), bank locations (Heard et al, 2018) and the effects of board independence on decision making (Bird et al, 2018).…”

How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects*

“…10 Hart (2003, p. C71) points out that he ignores ownership issues and that he takes bundling to be the key property of a public-private partnership. On the decision between public and private ownership, see Hart et al (1997) and the subsequent literature, such as Besley and Ghatak (2001), King and Pitchford (2008), Hoppe and Schmitz (2010), De Brux and Desrieux (2014), and Hamada (2017). 11 See also Chen and Chiu (2010) for a variant of the model of Bennett and Iossa (2006 conclude that "the important issue is not who owns the asset but instead whether tasks are bundled or not".…”

Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information

“… Hence, Hart et al (1997) is close to a private-good setup. For more recent work in this vein, see e.g King and Pitchford (2008),Hoppe and Schmitz (2010), De Brux and Desrieux (2014), and Hamada (2017…”