2011
DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_00054
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Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: A Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data

Abstract: Résumé:Les politiques de sécurité routière utilisent souvent des mécanismes incitatifs basés sur les infractions pour améliorer le comportement des conducteurs. Ces mécanismes sont par exemple des amendes, des primes d'assurance ou des permis à points. Nous analysons l'efficacité incitative de ces mécanismes. Nous obtenons leurs propriétés théoriques par rapport au nombre de points associés aux infractions et par rapport au temps contrat. Ces propriétés sont ensuite testées empiriquement avec des données issue… Show more

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Cited by 52 publications
(49 citation statements)
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“…The same public enterprise is also in charge of the point-record license system. Dionne, Pinquet et al (2011) show that the new insurance pricing scheme introduced in 1992 reduced the number of traffic violations by 15%. They also verified that there is residual ex ante moral hazard in road safety management.…”
Section: Ex Post Moral Hazard Demand For Medical Services and Duratmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 3 more Smart Citations
“…The same public enterprise is also in charge of the point-record license system. Dionne, Pinquet et al (2011) show that the new insurance pricing scheme introduced in 1992 reduced the number of traffic violations by 15%. They also verified that there is residual ex ante moral hazard in road safety management.…”
Section: Ex Post Moral Hazard Demand For Medical Services and Duratmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The model proposed by Dionne, Pinquet et al (2011) tests for an increasing link between traffic violations and the number of accumulated demerit points over time. Rejecting the positive link is evidence of moral hazard.…”
Section: Testing For Moral Hazard Inmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…Abbring, Chiappori and Zavadil (2008) study dynamic incentives of experience-rated policy and find evidence of moral hazard in the Dutch auto insurance market. Using data from the Quebec public insurance plan, Dionne et al (2011) also find evidence that accumulated demerit points incentivize safer driving due to the threat of driver's license revocation. Furthermore, Dionne, Michaud and Dahchour (2013) use experience-rated, longitudinal survey data with dynamic information both on claims and accidents from France during the 1995-1997 period and find evidence of moral hazard among a subgroup of policyholders with on the road again: traffic fatalities and auto insurance minimums public sector economics 42 (1) 45-65 (2018) 49 less than 15 years of driving experience.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 90%