Incentive of retailer information sharing on manufacturer volume flexibility choice

A study on how to achieve flexibility in healthcare process: a simulation-based approach

“…Volume flexibility can be achieved by altering the amount of resource capacity at different stages of the patient care process (De Giovanni and Massab o, 2018;Fagefors et al, 2020;Wei et al, 2021). Some recent studies have highlighted that flexibility in the healthcare sector can increase the capability and facilitate patient care efficiency (Akhlaq et al, 2018;Kumar, 2020;Kumar et al, , 2020Nair et al, 2013).…”

“…The different operations management studies have argued that volume flexibility is essential to achieve service capability enhancement (De Giovanni and Massab o, 2018;Fagefors et al, 2020;Wei et al, 2021). In their study, Wadhwa et al (2007) used the simulation model and argued that the healthcare sector should achieve a flexible system to promote better customer service and patient care.…”

“…Volume flexibility can be achieved by altering the amount of resource capacity at different stages of the patient care process (De Giovanni and Massabò, 2018; Fagefors et al. , 2020; Wei et al. , 2021).…”

A conceptual framework for information-leakage-resilience

“…However, while information sharing is desirable in supply chain collaboration, structured methods to ensure the effectiveness of information sharing have not been empirically demonstrated and validated (Mangus et al, 2020;Sener et al, 2019;Shaw et al, 2017). While there are reports of organisations and supply chains on knowledge sharing (Wang & Zhang, 2020;Wei et al, 2020), these investigations are typically anecdotal case studies. There is also a lack of scientific studies on information sharing strategies and issues faced by firms, such as degrees of information security culture and information leakage respectively and linking them to supply chain resilience.…”

Information sharing when competing manufacturers adopt asymmetric channel in an e-tailer

“…For example, Li and Zhang [18] examine the effect of different confidentiality level on information sharing, and find that all parties may have incentives to engage in information sharing; Ha et al [7] study competing supply chains with production technologies that exhibit diseconomies of scale, and show that information sharing can benefit the supply chain due to the order uncertain effect when the production diseconomy is large; Shang et al [21] also examine the effect of nonlinear cost on information sharing in a supply chain with two competing manufacturers selling substitute products through a common retailer, and they show that the incentive to share information depends on nonlinear production cost, competition intensity; considering a model of a retailer and a make-to-stock manufacturer, Li and Zhang [19] find that the retailer will be willing to share the imperfect demand information with the make-to-stock manufacturer if the magnitude of demand uncertainty is intermediate; Zhang and Chen [32] study how different coordination mechanisms affect the information sharing in a supply chain, and show that the decisions of information sharing depend on the coordination mechanism and some parameters. Wang et al [26] study information sharing when the incumbent retailer is endowed with a dominant position, and show that information sharing has opposite effects on different members; Jiang and Hao [14] consider four representative two-tier supply chains, and the results indicate that the supplier will acquire signals because of the differential payment offered to downstream firms or sufficiently correlated signals; Ha et al [6] consider competing supply chains with production cost reduction, and show that information sharing can benefit the supply chain if the manufacturer is efficient in cost reduction; Huang et al [9] point out that the retailer may voluntarily share the demand information in anticipation of supplier encroachment; Zhang and Zhang [35] consider an e-tailer's information sharing incentives in the presence of both agency selling and reselling, and find that under agency selling or reselling, the e-tailer can strategically share or withhold the demand information to deter the supplier from offline entry; Sun et al [22] study the interaction of quantity-based cost decline and supplier encroachment in a supply chain in which a supplier with encroachment capability and quantity-based cost decline sells through a retailer with demand information advantage, and obtain their impacts on the supply chain members; Wei et al [28] investigate incentive of retailer information sharing on manufacturer volume flexibility choice, and obtain the equilibrium strategies regarding retailer's information sharing and manufacturer's volume flexibility choice; Zhang et al [33] consider manufacturer encroachment with both endogenous quality decision and asymmetric demand information, and study the effects of encroachment and information structure on quality and profits for chain members; Zhang et al [34] consider a dual-channel s...…”