Incentive Schemes in Peer-to-Peer Networks

Loginova, Oksana; Lu, Huangjun; Wang, X. Henry

doi:10.2202/1935-1704.1501

Cited by 16 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…As an alternative scenario, suppose that the protocol designer can enforce full sharing among peers, but not sharing levels. 16 The resulting CPS game is called the CPS game with enforced full sharing. Formally, the CPS game with enforced full sharing is a restricted version of the CPS game where the stage-two choice of each peer i is fixed as y i = x i .…”

Section: Enforced Full Sharingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The following proposition characterizes allocations at the SE of the CPS game with enforced full sharing. 16 For example, full sharing can be enforced when there exists an indispensable technology for production and peers have access to it under the condition of sharing the produced content.…”

Section: Enforced Full Sharingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…[15] and [16] apply the mechanism design approach to build optimal incentive-compatible differential service schemes. [17] uses both repeated game and mechanism design approaches to propose cheat-proof and attack-resistant differential service schemes.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Another distinctive feature of our framework is that we allow peers to make production decisions whereas most of existing works assume that peers are endowed with a certain amount of content (see, for example, [11], [16]). When produced content and downloaded content are substitutable in consumption, the amount of content a peer produces is affected by the amount of content available in a P2P network.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentives in Content Production and Sharing Over Peer-to-Peer Networks

Park

Schaar

2010

IEEE J. Sel. Top. Signal Process.

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User-generated content can be distributed at a low cost using peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, but the free-rider problem hinders the utilization of P2P networks. In order to achieve an efficient use of P2P networks, we investigate fundamental issues on incentives in content production and sharing using game theory. We build a basic model to analyze non-cooperative outcomes without an incentive scheme and then use different game formulations derived from the basic model to examine five incentive schemes:cooperative, payment, repeated interaction, intervention, and enforced full sharing. The results of this paper show that 1) cooperative peers share all produced content while non-cooperative peers do not share at all without an incentive scheme; 2) a cooperative scheme allows peers to consume more content than non-cooperative outcomes do; 3) a cooperative outcome can be achieved among non-cooperative peers by introducing an incentive scheme based on payment, repeated interaction, or intervention; and 4) enforced full sharing has ambiguous welfare effects on peers. In addition to describing the solutions of different formulations, we discuss enforcement and informational requirements to implement each solution, aiming to offer a guideline for protocol designers when designing incentive schemes for P2P networks.

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Section: Enforced Full Sharingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Enforced Full Sharingmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentives in Content Production and Sharing Over Peer-to-Peer Networks

Park

Schaar

2010

IEEE J. Sel. Top. Signal Process.

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“…So the total cost for participating in the system for a p i with cooperation level of d i will be c i d i (linear cost is commonly used in the literature [8,[15][16][17]). On the other hand, cooperation of each peer potentially benefits other participating peers in the system.…”

Section: A Measuring the Cost And Benefitmentioning

confidence: 99%

A decision-analytic approach for P2P cooperation policy setting

Vakili

Papaioannou

Khorsandi

2010

Proceedings of the 2010 Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation

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Abstract-While overall performance of peer-to-peer systems depends strongly on the amount of resource contributions made by individual peers, autonomous and rational peers make decisions on their cooperation policies (resource contributions) according to their individual utilities. To deal with the inherent conflict among individual utilities of the rational peers to improve overall performance of the system, we propose a decision-analytic approach that determines the appropriate cooperation policies of the individual peers in a distributed manner and coordinates their rational decisions in compliance with the social welfare improvement.

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Emergence of cooperation in peer‐to‐peer systems: A complex adaptive system approach

Vakili

Tabatabaee

Khorsandi

2012

Systems Engineering

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Overall performance of a peer-to-peer system can be highly variable and unpredictable as there is no central authority to set and coordinate the amount of resource contributions made by constituent peers. In this paper, we address the problem of optimal cooperation policy setting for individual peers by taking into account their rationality, and with respect to a set of overall constraints imposed by resource-driven requirements of the system. We formalize distributed cooperation policy setting as an asynchronous distributed decision making (ADDM) process and represent an integrated design for this process in two top-down and bottom-up phases. In top-down design, we specify the overall objective and constraints and in line with them, we synthesize the local objectives of individual peers. We show that the rational peers should continuously adapt their cooperation policies asynchronously and autonomously according to the policies of the other participants in order to maximize their local objectives. To this end, we devise a self-organizing interaction mechanism in the bottom-up phase and demonstrate that it coordinates asynchronous distributed decisions of individual peers with respect to the overall objective and constraints through local interactions.

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Incentive Schemes in Peer-to-Peer Networks

Cited by 16 publications

References 31 publications

A Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentives in Content Production and Sharing Over Peer-to-Peer Networks

A Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentives in Content Production and Sharing Over Peer-to-Peer Networks

A decision-analytic approach for P2P cooperation policy setting

Emergence of cooperation in peer‐to‐peer systems: A complex adaptive system approach

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