Incentive to Discriminate? An Experimental Investigation of Teacher Incentives in India

Jain, Tarun; Narayan, Tulika

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1435818

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…In a situation with strong social heterogeneity and prejudice, teachers might focus on assisting high-status students, while neglecting lower caste pupils. The experiments reveals that poorly designed incentive plans lead to such a misallocation of teacher effort, which produces unequal distribution of effort across student groups, but properly designed incentives can mitigate such behavior (Jain and Narayan 2011).…”

Section: Laboratory Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Performance-Related Pay in the Public Sector: A Review of Theory and Evidence

Hasnain¹,

Manning²,

Henryk³

2012

Policy Research Working Papers

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The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.

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Section: Laboratory Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Performance-Related Pay in the Public Sector: A Review of Theory and Evidence

Hasnain¹,

Manning²,

Henryk³

2012

Policy Research Working Papers

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“…A laboratory experiment in India assessed teacher efforts when rewards were a function of average student test scores and revealed that poorly designed incentive plans led to the misallocation of teacher effort, which produced an unequal distribution of effort across student groups. However, properly designed incentives could mitigate such behavior (Jain and Narayan 2011). Overall, raising the quality bar still produces a positive result for craft and coping jobs ( Figure 5).…”

Section: Narrowing By Qualitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Promise of Performance Pay? Reasons for Caution in Policy Prescriptions in the Core Civil Service

Hasnain¹,

Manning²,

Pierskalla

2014

The World Bank Research Observer

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There is a vast body of literature on performance-related pay (PRP), with strongly held views from opponents and proponents. This study reviews this literature, disaggregating the available evidence by the different public sector contexts, particularly the different types of public sector jobs, the quality of the empirical study, and the economic context (developing country or OECD settings), with the aim of distilling useful lessons for policymakers in developing countries. The overall findings of the review are generally positive across these contextual categories. In particular, the findings from high quality studies, based on a simple scoring method for internal and external validity, of PRP in public sector-equivalent jobs show that explicit performance standards linked to some form of bonus pay can improve the desired service outcomes, at times dramatically. This evidence primarily concerns "craft" jobs, such as teaching, health care, and revenue administration, apparently negating (at least in the short term) the behavioral economics concern about the crowding out of intrinsic incentives. The available evidence suggests that if policymakers are sensitive to design and vigilant about the risks of gaming, then PRP may result in performance improvements in these jobs in developing countries. However, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from the review about the effect of PRP in core civil service jobs for three reasons. First, there are very few studies of PRP in these organizational contexts. The work of senior administrators in the civil service is very different from that of many private sector jobs and is characterized by task complexity and the difficulty of measuring outcomes. Second, although some studies have shown that PRP can work in even the most dysfunctional bureaucracies in developing countries, there are few cases illustrating its effectiveness or otherwise outside OECD settings. Finally, few studies follow PRP effects over time, providing little information on long-term effects and adjustments in staff

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“…We think that this is reasonable, as a teacher that spent in a consistent way significantly larger amounts of time with some students than with others is likely to be challenged by parents, except for very special children (say, because they have an obvious disability). Even in countries with a history of discrimination, unequal treatment within a classroom occurs only under special circumstances (see, e.g.,Jain and Narayan (2011)).…”

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confidence: 99%

Motivation, Resources and the Organization of the School System

Cabrales,

Berlinski,

Albornoz

2016

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This paper studies a model where student effort and talent interact with parental and teachers' investments, as well as with school system resources. The model is rich, yet sufficiently stylized to provide novel implications. It can show, for example, that an improvement in parental outside options will reduce parental and school effort, which are partially compensated through school resources. In this way, by incorporating the behavioral responses of parents, teachers and policymakers, the paper provides a rationale for the existing ambiguous empirical evidence on the effect of school resources. The paper also provides a novel microfoundation for peer effects, with empirical implications for welfare and different education policies.

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Incentive to Discriminate? An Experimental Investigation of Teacher Incentives in India

Cited by 6 publications

References 22 publications

Performance-Related Pay in the Public Sector: A Review of Theory and Evidence

Performance-Related Pay in the Public Sector: A Review of Theory and Evidence

The Promise of Performance Pay? Reasons for Caution in Policy Prescriptions in the Core Civil Service

Motivation, Resources and the Organization of the School System

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