Incentives and Equity under Standards-based Reform

Abstract

The paper considers theoretical and empirical evidence on the impact of standards-based school reform. Our theoretical synthesis distinguishes between sorting and incentive effects of high standards, and spells out the potential tradeoffs and complementarities between enhancing efficiency and equity in student achievement. Differentiated credentials can be helpful in ameliorating tradeoffs, provided that distinct signals are clearly understood, especially between cognitive and non-cognitive skills. The paper reviews trends in state-level school accountability systems, and examines empirical evidence on the impact of increased standards and expectations on student achievement.Finally, the paper reviews some of the practical challenges facing the standards movement.

Tougher Educational Exam Leading to Worse Selection

“…10 The key difference from our model and Bett's is the use of two types of skills (cognitive and noncognitive) in the production function instead of only one. In Betts' model, when the standard rises, there is an increase in the average productivity of those students who pass and fail the exam.…”

“…They made the analysis separately by race and concluded that more difficult exit exams tended to reduce the subsequent earnings of white and hispanic students while increasing those of black students. Costrell and Betts (2000) indicate that the most vocal opposition to a rise in standards comes from high achievers, which are the likely beneficiaries of the change. 9 Heckman and Rubinstein (2001) analyze the effects of the General Educational Development (GED) exam, which is taken by high school dropouts to certify that they have equivalent knowledge to high school graduates.…”

High School Exit Examinations: When Do Learning Effects Generalize?

“…If only a passfail signal is generated by an exam and passing is necessary to graduate, the standard will almost inevitably be set low enough to allow almost everyone to pass after multiple tries. The bulk of students who can easily pass the test are not induced to work harder (Becker & Rosen, 1992;Betts & Costrell, 2001;Costrell, 1994). CBEEES signal achievement levels, so all students, not just those at the bottom of the class, have an incentive to study hard.…”

“…• Economists who have analyzed learning incentives agree that teacher grades are valuable motivators for students to try hard in class. The incentive effects of external assessments are different but complementary to the incentive effects of teacher grades (Becker & Rosen, 1992;Betts & Costrell, 2001;Costrell, 1994;Powell, 1996). Both forms of evaluation should be used (Board of Admissions and Relations with Schools, 2002;Coleman et al, 1997).…”

Tougher Educational Exam Leading to Worse Selection

“…They made the analysis separately by race and concluded that more difficult exit exams tended to reduce the subsequent earnings of white and hispanic students while increasing those of black students. Costrell and Betts (2000) indicate that the most vocal opposition to a rise in standards comes from high achievers, which are the likely beneficiaries of the change. Heckman and Rubinstein (2001) analyze the effects of the General Educational Development (GED) exam, which is taken by high school dropouts to certify that they have equivalent knowledge to high school graduates.…”