This paper examines how incentives to participate in online assessments (quizzes) affect students' effort and performance. Our identification strategy exploits within-student weekly variation in incentives to attempt online quizzes. We find tournament incentives and participation incentives to be ineffective in increasing quiz participation. In contrast, making the quiz counts towards the final grade substantially increases participation. We find no evidence of displacement of effort between weeks. Using a natural experiment which provides variation in assessment weighting of the quizzes between two cohorts, we find that affected students obtain better exam grades. We estimate the return to 10% assessment weighting to be around 0.27 of a standard deviation in the in-term exam grade. We find no evidence that assessment weighting has unintended consequences, i.e., that increased quiz effort: displaces effort over the year; reduces other forms of effort; or reduces (effort and thus) performance in other courses. Finally, assessment weighting induced effort increases most for students at and below median ability, resulting in a reduction of the grade gap by 17%.
JEL Code: I23, D20Keywords: Incentive, Effort displacement, Effort, Higher Education Acknowledgement: We wish to acknowledge the help of the administrative staff at RHUL and thank Eleftherios Giovanis for research assistance. We are grateful to Macke Raymond, Edwin Leuven, Hessel Oosterbeek, Susan Dynarski, John Bound, Santiago Oliveros and seminar participants at CESifo, RES, Sussex, Michigan, City University, Nuremberg, SOFI Stockholm, NIESR, SFI and IZA for comments. The editor and anonymous referees also provided numerous valuable comments that improved this manuscript. This project was partially financed by the RHUL Faculty Initiative Fund.