“…Hence, this may be a house money effect (treating windfalls differently that money obtained through "normal" channels). Nonetheless, commitment has been documented in a wide range of settings: e.g., preference for costly single-unit packaging of tempting snacks (Wertenbroch 1998); self-imposed work deadlines with financial penalties (Ariely and Wertenbroch 2002;Bisin and Hyndman 2014); self-imposed financial penalties for smoking or drinking (Giné, Karlan, and Zinman 2010;Schilbach Forthcoming); self-imposed financial penalties for underperformance in the workplace (Kaur, Kremer, and Mullainathan 2010); selfimposed restrictions on internet access (Houser et al 2018); self-imposed restrictions on work scheduling (Augenblick, Niederle, and Sprenger 2015); and self-imposed financial penalties for failure to exercise (Royer, Stehr, and Sydnor 2015). Despite all of these examples of experimentally measured commitment demand, researchers have noted that very little pure commitment is demanded/provided in real markets (Laibson 2015).…”