Incentives for promoting climate change adaptation technologies in agriculture: an evolutionary game approach

Abstract

Climate change adaptation technologies (CCATs) have become an important tool for farmers to cope with climate change and address the risks of natural disasters, but in many rural areas, there is still a reliance on traditional agricultural techniques. It is necessary to explore the incentives for promoting CCATs in agriculture, and the conditions for the effectiveness and realization of policy measures. In this paper, we construct an evolutionary game model to analyze the behaviour of local governments and farmers in promoting CCATs. Our ndings are as follows: Under certain conditions, the evolutionary game of promoting CCATs in agriculture can achieve equilibrium. Within a certain range, the incentive for farmers to choose to adopt CCATs increases with local governments' risk subsidy and cost-sharing. When the subsidy is too high, local governments may choose the no-promotion strategy, under which the policy incentive disappears, reducing the incentive for farmers to adopt CCATs. Publicity is an important incentive for promoting CCATs, and its effect is evident. Our ndings provide insights into the development of policies to promote CCATs in agriculture.

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“…Constructing mathematical models, allows for the formal analysis of different strategies and their interactions, aiding our understanding and explanation of behavioral phenomena in human society. The extensive application of this theory in various domains, such as industrial policy ( 22 , 23 ), technology policy ( 21 , 24 ), and environmental policy ( 25 , 26 ), has provided valuable insights and inspiration to my work. Leveraging the framework of evolutionary game theory, we construct a dynamic game model encompassing regulators, PIPHE, and whistle-blowers.…”

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“…Eventually, these players reach an evolutionary stable equilibrium state. The applications of evolutionary game theory span across various fields, including industrial policy [31], environmental policy [32], and supply chain management [25,33]. These studies have yielded valuable insights, which serve as the foundation for this paper.…”