Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars

Abstract

This paper examines the conditions under which warring parties will accept an outside party's offer to mediate. Specifically, we explore variation in the incentives for accepting third-party offers in interstate conflicts as compared to civil wars. We argue that since mediation in civil wars transfers legitimacy to the non-state actor and can generate a precedent of exceptions to the norm of sovereignty, the political cost associated with accepting international mediation will be substantially higher in civil wars compared to international conflicts. States should therefore only accept mediation in the most serious disputes, or when the costs of legitimizing an opponent are outweighed by the benefits of conflict resolution. Building on this theoretical reasoning, the paper analyzes the implications of differences in incentive structures between inter-and intrastate conflicts for offer and acceptance of mediation. We find an empirical discrepancy between interstate and civil wars in regard to demand-side (acceptance) of mediation, and to a somewhat lesser extent the supply-side (offer) of international mediation. In line with our argument, we find that the historical ties between the potential intermediary and at least one of the disputants play different roles in regard to acceptance of mediation in interstate compared to civil wars. This is important to take into consideration in the emerging debate on mediation bias.

Relative rebel strength and the onset and outcome of civil war mediation

“…The introduction of an intermediary confers a more significant level of domestic and international recognition upon the rebels. It also clearly signals that the government has lost the capacity required to effectively control its territory (Melin & Svensson, 2009). This demonstration of state weakness can harm the government's reputation for resisting insurgent demands, resulting in both increased support for the rebel movement and motivation for other challengers to take up arms (Walter, 2006;Toft, 2003).…”

“…Rebel groups have strong incentives to open any form of dialogue with the government (Greig & Regan, 2008;Melin & Svensson, 2009). One of the defining characteristics of civil conflict is the power asymmetry between disputants (Zartman, 1995).…”

“…Therefore while states engaged in inter-state violence can open dialogue without serious cost, within civil conflict incumbents will only enter into negotiation when the costs associated with a process are outweighed by potential benefits of conflict resolution (Melin & Svensson, 2009). …”

Will we see helping hands? Predicting civil war mediation and likely success

“…Incumbents are more likely to resist mediation since admitting a third party to a domestic conflict signals that a state is unable to control its territory and undermines its autonomy (see Clayton, 2013;Greig and Regan, 2008;Melin and Svensson, 2009). Conversely, rebels can gain legitimacy and status as a result of international engagement and thus tend…”

Oil, relative strength and civil war mediation

“…The asymmetry in power and legitimacy provides insurgents with greater incentives to enter into mediation (Clayton, 2013;Gent, 2011;Zartman 1995). For the rebels, the onset of a dialogue process increases legitimacy and elevates their political status in a manner that is unlikely to occur through military means alone (Melin and Svensson 2009;Greig and Regan 2008). The initiation of mediation also demonstrates rebels ability to force concessions from the state, and moves them closer to achieving their political demands.…”