Incentivize cooperative sensing in distributed cognitive radio networks with reputation-based pricing

Abstract

Abstract-In a cognitive radio network, selfish secondary users may not voluntarily contribute to desired cooperative sensing. We design the first fully distributed scheme to incentivize participation of nodes in cooperative sensing, by connecting sensing and spectrum allocation, and offering incentive from latter to the former. Secondary users that are more active and report more accurate sensing values will be given higher reputation values, which results in lower prices in the spectrum allocation phase. Theoretical analysis and simulation results indicate that the proposed method effectively incentivizes sensing participation, and rewards truthful and accurate reporting. Our proposed system is fully distributed and does not rely on a central authority, and so is more applicable in dynamic cognitive radio networks in practice. We also show how to improve the robustness of reputation when malicious nodes report spurious reputation.

Secure Cooperative Spectrum Sensing and Allocation in Distributed Cognitive Radio Networks

“…To avoid the potential interference with the primary users, secondary users firstly sense whether the spectrum of interest is being used by the primary users. If the spectrum is unoccupied, the secondary users apply certain spectrum allocation scheme to decide which of them may access the available spectrum [3].…”

A Secure Collaborative Spectrum Sensing Strategy in Cyber-Physical Systems

“…For example, 48 an adversary may launch spectrum sensing data falsification 49 (SSDF) attacks, where the adversary corrupts a subset of 50 secondary users (SUs) as illustrated in the Fig. 1 to report 51 design [14], consensus algorithm [15], [18], outlier detection has been introduced into CPS to implement secure spectrum 77 sensing [9], [12], [16], [18]- [24]. 78 Although some reputation based CSS strategies have been 79 proposed in the literatures, most of them were based on the 80 trusted third party and traditional cryptographic encryption 81 and authentication techniques, thus ignoring internal attacks 82 launched by an inside attacker that has the legal identity and 83 dishonest recommendations used to frame up good parties 84 and/or boost trust values of malicious peers.…”

“…Spectrum sensing in CRN 128 have been widely studied, using game theory [13], incentive 129 design [14], consensus algorithm [18] In this paper, we focus on the network environment of CRN 203 based CPS (CRN-CPS), which is a viable solution to imple-204 ment fast and large-scale CPS applications [2], [4]. The 205 typical CRN-CPS architecture is depicted in Fig.…”

“…We suppose that each SU is equipped with a 209 cognitive radio and they utilize omnidirectional antennas to 210 communicate with each other. Meanwhile, SUs are located 211 within the transmission range of the PUs, and can individ-212 ually sense the environment to detect the existence of the 213 Pus [16], [18]. In the CSS process, we use the energy sensing 214 method for a SU to detect PUs' presence.…”

“…After getting the direct and recommended reputation, the final 478 reputation can be computed as: 493 enhance the sensing performance [16], [18]. However, it is 494 vulnerable to the internal attacks threats, which will make the 495 performance of CSS degrade significantly.…”