Incidence of moral hazards among health care providers in the implementation of social health insurance toward universal health coverage: evidence from rural province hospitals in Indonesia

Abstract

ObjectiveTo identify the incidence of moral hazards among health care providers and its determinant factors in the implementation of national health insurance in Indonesia.MethodsData were derived from 360 inpatient medical records from six types C public and private hospitals in an Indonesian rural province. These data were accumulated from inpatient medical records from four major disciplines: medicine, surgery, obstetrics and gynecology, and pediatrics. The dependent variable was provider moral hazards, which included indicators of up-coding, readmission, and unnecessary admission. The independent variables are Physicians' characteristics (age, gender, and specialization), coders' characteristics (age, gender, education level, number of training, and length of service), and patients' characteristics (age, birth weight, length of stay, the discharge status, and the severity of patient's illness). We use logistic regression to investigate the determinants of moral hazard.ResultsWe found that the incidences of possible unnecessary admissions, up-coding, and readmissions were 17.8%, 11.9%, and 2.8%, respectively. Senior physicians, medical specialists, coders with shorter lengths of service, and patients with longer lengths of stay had a significant relationship with the incidence of moral hazard.ConclusionUnnecessary admission is the most common form of a provider's moral hazard. The characteristics of physicians and coders significantly contribute to the incidence of moral hazard. Hospitals should implement reward and punishment systems for doctors and coders in order to control moral hazards among the providers.