Income, Preferences, and the Dynamics of Policy Responsiveness

Abstract

A variety of measures indicate that income inequality has grown significantly in the United States during the last three decades (APSA 2004; Brandolini and Smeeding 2006). In a flurry of recent research, scholars have attributed this trend to the failure of the national government to represent the preferences of ordinary citizens in general and less wealthy citizens in particular (APSA 2004; Bartels 2004; 2006; Gilens 2005), who participate in politics less consistently and contribute fewer resources to political candidates than their wealthier peers (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). The American Political Science Association's (APSA) Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy summarizes thisrepresentative failure hypothesis: “disparities in participation ensure that ordinary Americans speak in a whisper while the most advantaged roar” (2004, 2).

‘Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose’: The evolution and the structure of attitudes toward economic liberalism in France between 1990 and 2008

“…Confirming the literature on over-time similarity in preference change -that is, 'parallel publics' in Page and Shapiro's own words - (Page and Shapiro, 1992;Soroka and Wlezien, 2008;Ura and Ellis, 2008;Kelly and Enns, 2010), the exploratory MCAs presented in Appendix C show that between 1990 and 2008 all ideological groups clearly shifted toward more interventionist positions but do not seem to have moved on the third dimension (Egalitarianism). This finding is not surprising.…”

Income Inequality and Policy Responsiveness

“…It could be, however, that this seemingly egalitarian measure of mood is actually a marker for wealthy (or elite) opinion and it is really this elite that drives policy. This is conceivable because when opinions change across different income groups, they generally move in tandem (Ura & Ellis 2008, Wlezien & Siroka 2011. This similarity across income groups applies only to changes, not levels, of opinion.…”

Differential Responsiveness in Europe: The Effects of Preference Difference and Electoral Participation

“…The first explanation of the (non-)finding of differential responsiveness has to do with the extent to which the rich and the poor differ in their preferences. When different groups in society all want the same thing, we will not observe any difference in the congruence between preferences and policies of different groups (Soroka and Wlezien 2008;Ura and Ellis 2008). 2 Gilens (20112 Gilens ( , 2012 argues that a preference overlap between the rich and the poor makes policies more responsive to the poor by chance: 'any association between preferences and policy outcomes is likely to reflect the extent to which their preferences coincide with those of the affluent', and finds that a bigger preference gap is associated with a bigger gap in responsiveness to the extent that 'responsiveness to the less well-off Americans is virtually nonexistent' (Gilens 2011: 254).…”