Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven

Pawl, Timothy; Timpe, Kevin

doi:10.5840/faithphil200926437

Cited by 38 publications

(20 citation statements)

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“…The grounds for arguing that the person has implicitly consented to the changes that God will bring about in his or her character are weak in such cases. Pawl and Timpe's (2009) account fares a bit better here. Like Sennett's position, their view invokes the notion of derivative freedom, but we can again put that to one side as the basic idea works with derivative responsibility alone.…”

Section: The Problem Of Needing To Praise the Redeemed For Not Sinningmentioning

confidence: 79%

“…A different but complementary strategy is to argue that the redeemed will face at least some choices that are morally valuable or important, even though they will not involve choosing between good and bad options. Pawl and Timpe (2009;2013) pursue this strategy. Steven Cowan (2011) has criticised their view, while Christopher Brown (2015) has attempted to expand on it.…”

Section: The Problem Arising From God's Own Freedommentioning

confidence: 99%

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Some Problems of Heavenly Freedom

Kittle

2018

TheoLogica

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Abstract:In this essay I identify four different problems of heavenly freedom; i.e., problems that arise for those who hold that the redeemed in heaven have free will. They are: the problem arising from God's own freedom, the problem of needing to praise the redeemed for not sinning in heaven, the problem of needing to affirm that the redeemed freely refrain from sinning, and the problem arising from a commitment to the free will defence. I explore how some of these problems vary depending on the notion of free will which is endorsed. And I suggest that because these differing problems arise from distinct theological and/or philosophical commitments, there is little reason to think that one and the same feature or property of an account of heavenly freedom will address them all.

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Section: The Problem Of Needing To Praise the Redeemed For Not Sinningmentioning

confidence: 79%

Section: The Problem Arising From God's Own Freedommentioning

confidence: 99%

Some Problems of Heavenly Freedom

Kittle

2018

TheoLogica

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“…Elsewhere, we've considered the nature of the freedom of the redeemed in heaven (Pawl & Timpe, ). There we have argued that it is possible, even on a libertarian understanding of human freedom, to hold both (a) that the redeemed in heaven have freedom and (b) that they are no longer capable of sinning.…”

Section: Incarnate Freedom: Two (Non‐exhaustive) Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…28 The traditional view is that Christ, since God, could not sin. 29 Elsewhere, we've considered the nature of the freedom of the redeemed in heaven (Pawl & Timpe, 2009).…”

Section: Is Christ Able To Sin?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Freedom and the incarnation

Pawl¹,

Timpe

2016

Philosophy Compass

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In this paper, we explore how free will should be understood within the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, particularly on the assumption of traditional Christology. We focus on two issues: (i) reconciling Christ's free will with the claim that Christ's human will was subjected to the divine will in the Incarnation; and (ii) reconciling the claims that Christ was fully human and free with the belief that Christ, since God, could not sin.

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“…Portions of this paper are drawn from earlier work, most notablyPawl and Timpe (2009), andPawl and Timpe (2013).…”

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confidence: 99%

‘Upright, Whole, and Free’: Eschatological Union with God

Timpe

2018

TheoLogica

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In the closing canto of the Purgatorio in his Divine Comedy, Dante Alighieri describes the souls preparing to enter heaven as “new, remade, reborn, … perfect, pure, and ready for the Stars [i.e., heaven].” But what exactly would it mean for a human soul to be morally perfect and in perfect union with the divine will? Furthermore, if the soul fit for heaven is perfectly united with God, what sense does it make to think that individual retains their free will? In this talk, I assume a number of Christian claims about the Beatific Vision and argue that not only do the souls fit for heaven retain their freedom, but that they are in sense ‘more free’ despite their inability to do certain actions.

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Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven

Cited by 38 publications

References 0 publications

Some Problems of Heavenly Freedom

Some Problems of Heavenly Freedom

Freedom and the incarnation

‘Upright, Whole, and Free’: Eschatological Union with God

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